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Abstract
SARAH F. RILEY: Renaissance Man Meets the Pin Factory:
A Theory of Diverse Specialization under Uncertainty.
(Under the direction of Gary Biglaiser.)
The fraction of university students in the US graduating with multiple majors or joint de-
grees has been increasing for at least the last decade, but this trend has not yet been explained.
I demonstrate theoretically that innate ability differences are sufficient to create divergence
in observed skill investment patterns across individuals and that changes in uncertainty can
contribute to changes in the fraction and types of students who acquire more than one skill
before entering the skilled labor force for the first time. I assume that the level and balance of
abilities constrain the investment possibilities open to students. I find that only in the pres-
ence of significant cost complementarities, in the forms of economies of scale or learning by
doing, are the brightest and most balanced students the most likely to acquire two marketable
skills. This case occurs when the cost per skill falls sufficiently that the marginal surpluses
from skill level and skill diversity become positive for the most balanced individuals, who face
the greatest absolute skill cost, while perceived uncertainty is sufficiently high to provide the
most generally able individuals with an incentive for acquiring more than one skill. After
this theoretical exploration, I consider the abilities and skill investment patterns of a group
of recent bachelor’s degree recipients from UNC-Chapel Hill. The results of this empirical
analysis suggest that abilities at matriculation play a far more important role than financial or
other demographic factors in determining skill investments, and that cost complementarities
are present in the skill acquisition process. The most generally able students in this sample
are the most likely to double major, but neither the most able nor the most balanced make
the most diverse undergraduate investment. In combination, the results of these analyses sug-
gest that the fraction of students with a double major has been increasing over time within
ii
institutions of higher learning because (1) the mean level of general ability of admitted stu-
dents has been increasing from year to year, and (2) increased perceived wage uncertainty has
encouraged the most able students to diversify their skills by adopting a second major.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivation and Research Questions
Human capital diversification is generally very costly. Nevertheless, some individuals do be-
come highly skilled in a variety of fields, even before entering the work force. In fact, such skill
diversification is becoming increasingly popular in the US among highly educated workers, who
frequently graduate from college with multiple majors or participate in joint professional de-
gree programs. For example, Georgetown University and Washington University in St. Louis
saw the fractions of their students graduating with multiple majors or degrees rise from 14%
in 1996 to 23% in 2002, and from 28% in 1997 to 42% in 2001, respectively.1 Similarly, the
fraction of students graduating with multiple undergraduate majors from UNC-Chapel Hill
increased from 20% in 1999 to 28% in 2006.2 Thus, large numbers of the highly educated are
finding skill diversification quite feasible.
Some of these students appear to be obtaining multiple credentials in response to what they
perceive as recent increases in the competitiveness and uncertainty of the skilled labor market.
For example, one college student quoted in a 2002 article in the New York Times3 concerning
1See the November 17, 2002, New York Times article entitled For Students Seeking Edge, One Major Just
Isn’t Enough.
2These percentages come from my analysis data sample, which has been refined somewhat from the UNC
database of all graduates during this time period.
3Ibid.
the recent growth in the fraction of college students choosing double and triple majors in the
US went so far as to state, “I’m hedging my bets. The more fields I am prepared or qualified
to work in the less I have to worry about problems in any given industry.” Furthermore, an
academic administrator interviewed for the same article acknowledged a growing trend: “I
think students are increasingly aware that they might have more than one career, that they
might need expertise in a variety of areas.”4 In short, a self-insurance motive seems to drive
the choice of multiple specialties in some cases.
At least two factors have likely contributed to such student perceptions and behavior. First,
the relative likelihoods of employment of educated and uneducated workers in the US have been
converging since the middle of the last century,5 suggesting that a higher level of education
is no longer the relative job “insurance” that it once was. This trend may have contributed
to a perception by students that it is no longer enough simply to attain a high level of edu-
cation: breadth is also requisite for sustained skilled employment. Second, wage uncertainty
among college graduates has also been increasing over this period. Common explanations for
this increase in skilled wage dispersion include technological change and outsourcing, a rel-
ative increase in the supply and heterogeneity of college graduates, changes in industry and
firm structure, and a shift toward more flexible or insecure employment conditions, including
part-time work.6 The popular media, in particular, has done much to instill the idea that
outsourcing may play a large role in undermining US job and wage security for skilled work-
ers. To the extent that highly educated workers view this change in wage dispersion as an
increase in the idiosyncratic risk associated with their expected wages following graduation, it
is reasonable that these workers should attempt to diversify their employment opportunities
4The article also suggests that some students are majoring in several fields because it is easier for them to do
so than in previous years. That is, more students are entering college with Advanced Placement or International
Baccalaureate credit, which frequently may be applied to satisfy general distribution requirements, and thus
have more flexibility in selecting their coursework.
5See Aaronson and Sullivan (1998), Gardner (1995), Boisjoly, Duncan, and Smeeding (1998), Polsky (1999),
Stewart (2000), Farber (2001), Rodriguez and Zavodny (2003), and Helwig (2004).
6See Autor, Katz, and Kearney (2005); Gottschalk and Hansen (2005); McCall (2000); Hoxby and Terry
(1999); Pryor and Schaffer (1997); DiNardo, Fortin, and Lemieux (1996); Katz and Murphy (1992); and Levy
and Murnane (1992).
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by acquiring expertise in multiple fields.
Nevertheless, the majority of students in higher education continues to specialize in only
one area. Therefore, it is natural to ask what is different about those students who do choose
to diversify. In this paper, I demonstrate theoretically that innate ability differences7 are
sufficient to create divergence in observed skill investment patterns across individuals and that
changes in uncertainty in this context can contribute to changes in the fraction and types of
students who select more than one skill.
In particular, individuals differ both in the level of their innate general cognitive ability
and in the balance of their innate specific cognitive abilities. For example, some individuals
learn faster and are able to grasp abstract concepts more readily than others; such individuals
are more generally able. Similarly, some individuals have natural talent for both mathematics
and languages in equal measure, while others have a definite predisposition for one area of
study or the other; such individuals are more balanced in their specific abilities. These two
types of innate ability difference are in part responsible for variation in the number of skills
that highly educated individuals acquire prior to entering the skilled labor market for the first
time.
More formally, evidence from psychology suggests that two major categories of cognitive
ability, or “intelligence,” are likely to have impacts on educational achievement. The first,
and more salient, of the two is the general intelligence factor g. This latent variable has the
colloquial interpretation of an individual’s overall ability to learn and to engage in higher-order
thinking skills. For example, we may associate abstract reasoning ability, as well as rapidity of
thought, largely with the factor g. This factor typically explains a majority of the predictable
variation in scholastic achievement test scores.8 The second category of cognitive ability that
should impact educational achievement comprises the group factors that are associated with
7“Innate cognitive abilities” need not necessarily refer to cognitive abilities at birth, exclusive of environ-
mental and developmental factors. Rather, these may simply be the abilities that are realized, or “crystallized,”
prior to college entry.
8See Jensen (1998) and Ree and Carretta (1994).
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g. Examples of group factors commonly identified in this context include verbal, mathemat-
ical, and analytic reasoning abilities. 9 Such specific cognitive factors typically explain the
remaining predictable variation in tests of academic achievement.
Thus, an individual’s level of general cognitive ability partly reflects his overall potential
for learning skills at greater depth. Similarly, an individual’s balance in specific cognitive
abilities should partly reflect his relative potential for learning a greater variety of specific
skills. Therefore, a lack of ability in either of these two dimensions may place limits on the
extent to which an individual finds either specialization or diversification worthwhile.
However, the way in which individual abilities interact with perceived uncertainty to deter-
mine skill number choice has not yet been considered, and it is not obvious a priori that more
generally able or more balanced individuals should necessarily be the most likely to specialize
in more than one skill area in this situation. Because individuals who are more generally able
are also more highly compensated for a given level of education and are also more likely to
be employed, it may be that the expected benefit from investing in one skill is sufficiently
high to offset the diversification incentive provided by uncertainty; in this case, those of higher
general ability would be less likely than their less able peers to invest in a larger number of
fields. Similarly, individuals who are more balanced in their specific abilities may have more
career options for any given level of skill, and this wider range of available choices may deter
educational investment through the mechanism of anticipated regret10. These individuals may
also find any given skill more costly because of a weaker innate skill preference. In this case,
more balanced individuals would be less likely than their less balanced peers to invest in any
one skill, not to mention two or more.
With these observations in mind, I characterize more specifically how abilities and per-
ceived uncertainty interact to determine whether an individual should optimally choose to
diversify before entering the skilled labor market for the first time. I employ a spatial, ana-
lytic model that incorporates ability constraints in two dimensions and allows skill choice in
9Alternatively, academic and technical group factors may arise, as has been the case in analyses of the
ASVAB. See Ree and Carretta (1994)
10See Schwartz (2004).
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three dimensions: an individual of a particular balance of specific abilities and a particular
level of general ability chooses the number, level, and diversity of his skills for a given level
of exogenous, diversifiable wage uncertainty. The model is designed primarily to capture how
abilities operate through costs to determine skill acquisition patterns. Specifically, I assume
that general ability constrains individuals because it is costly to over- or under-invest in edu-
cation level. In addition, I assume that specific-ability balance constrains individuals through
the psychic cost of anticipated regret and weaker affinity for any specific skill. This model
allows me to characterize which individuals are most likely to select more than one skill at
various levels of uncertainty. After this theoretical exploration, I then consider empirically the
relationship between the abilities and skill investment patterns of a group of recent bachelor’s
degree recipients from the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.
As should be clear from the above discussion, I take an interdisciplinary (and slightly
behavioral) approach to analyzing the relationship between ability and skill investment. This
choice is appropriate for two reasons. First, the psychic costs, as well as the economic costs,
arising from ability differences are likely to impact skill investment decisions. Therefore, I
assume that the cost associated with general ability may include anticipated non-wage job
dissatisfaction resulting from over- or under-investment in education level, in addition to the
obvious economic costs of foregone wages or excess tuition expenditures that would also be
relevant in these cases. Similarly, I assume that the cost deriving from greater specific-ability
balance includes the anticipated regret resulting from having too many skill investment options.
Second, and more important, the concept of ability means many different things to different
people: some interpret it as a form of cognitive competence, while others see it as all-inclusive
of any behaviors and/or personality traits that contribute to success. To avoid confusion,
therefore, I define ability very narrowly, using latent variable concepts from psychometrics,
such as g and its associated group factors. Analogously precise definitions of ability do not
exist in economics.
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1.2 Contributions to the Literature
To the best of my knowledge, this analysis departs from existing theoretical economic literature
in at least three respects. First, I consider the joint impact of both ability and perceived
uncertainty on skill investment. Existing work considers the isolated impact of either ability11
or uncertainty12 on human capital acquisition, but not both.13 However, uncertainty may
encourage some individuals to invest in multiple skills while discouraging others.
Second, I consider ability as two distinct endowments. These endowments operate in
independent dimensions to influence the costs of skill acquisition. In contrast, existing work
generally considers ability as a one-dimensional endowment that is perfectly transferable across
intensive and extensive investment margins.14 However, such an assumption is restrictive.
Many different types of ability exist that do not necessarily translate into universal competence.
Third, I consider skill choice in three dimensions. Existing work considers the choice of
skills in at most two dimensions, namely level and breadth, or level and number. In reality,
however, individuals must choose the number, level, and breadth of their skills. Moreover, the
distinction between skill number and skill breadth, or diversity, is important. Acquiring two
skills is more beneficial from a standpoint of labor demand diversification when those skills
have little in common.
In addition, this paper contributes to the empirical economic literature on educational
investment by considering which student characteristics influence the decision to double major.
A wealth of papers has considered the role of ability in determining educational attainment
11Weiss (1971) discusses the impact of a one-dimensional ability measure on the time spent in school. Baum-
gardner (1988) considers the impact of the productive endowment of physicians on their depth and breadth of
service. Lazear (2003, 2004, 2005) examines the effects of specific-ability balance and entrepreneurial talent on
the level and number of skills acquired by entrepreneurs.
12 Levhari and Weiss (1974) and Eaton and Rosen (1980) consider the impact of uncertainty on skill level
investment. Grossman and Shapiro (1982) and Murphy (1986) examine the impact of uncertainty on the choice
of general versus specialized human capital.
13 Kim (1989), Murphy (1986), and Baumgardner (1988) also examine the impact of the extent of the market
on the level and breadth of investment/provision. Johnson (1979) considers the impact of ex post occupational
mobility on the demand for breadth of training.
14A notable exception is the work of Lazear (2003). (See also Lazear (2004) and Lazear (2005)). Lee (2005)
extends Lazear’s work to occupational categories other than entrepreneur.
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and the returns to education, as well as selection into a specific single major field. However, I
am aware of only one paper that investigates the implications of choosing a second major15,
and that investigation focuses on the wage returns to such an investment after graduation,
rather than on the undergraduate skill investment process.
1.3 Key Results and Policy Implications
The basic theoretical framework suggests that all individuals specialize fully under low per-
ceived uncertainty. The relative benefit from diversification is small, and individuals acquire
a higher level of skill when uncertainty is low. Therefore, the benefit to skill investment is
highest under low uncertainty, and all individuals find it worthwhile to acquire a skill, but
there is insufficient incentive to invest in more than one.
As perceived uncertainty increases, individuals of lowest general ability and greatest ability
balance are the first to respond to increases in uncertainty by choosing to acquire no skills, or
to opt out of the skilled labor market. This result stems from the facts that these individuals
(1) acquire a low level of skill, which translates into a relatively low return, and (2) find skill
acquisition very costly: this combination provides a strong disincentive for skill investment.
Extremely high levels of uncertainty discourage skill acquisition by any but the least bal-
anced. More generally able individuals over-invest in skill level and face a higher cost from
that investment; as a result, they are less likely to diversify, given that they choose to acquire
one skill.
The implications of the model become less stylized and more intuitive when the cost per
skill is allowed to vary with the number of skills acquired. In this extended model, the set of
individuals who select more than one skill varies with both the level of uncertainty and the
degree of cost complementarity and may include or favor the most balanced and most generally
able individuals.
Under high perceived uncertainty, individuals of lesser specific-ability balance are most
likely to acquire multiple skills. However, those of greater specific-ability balance may be more
15See Del Rossi and Hersch (2008).
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likely than those of intermediate specific-ability balance to acquire multiple skills, depending
on the extent to which the cost per skill falls as the number of skills acquired increases. Also
in this case, individuals of higher general ability are more likely to acquire a positive number
of skills but may be either more or less likely than less able individuals to specialize fully,
depending on the extent to which the cost per skill falls as the number of skills acquired
increases.
More generally, the intuition underlying skill investment patterns for all individuals is
as follows. The least balanced are the most likely to face a positive marginal surplus from
skill diversity. In the presence of a significant cost complementarity, the set of those with a
positive marginal surplus from diversity expands to include the most balanced individuals.
Those of intermediate specific-ability balance follow as the cost complementarity increases.
Furthermore, all individuals generally face a negative marginal surplus from level in the absence
of a significant cost complementarity. However, as the cost complementarity increases, this
marginal surplus becomes positive for all individuals. The absolute value of the marginal level
surplus term increases with general ability. Therefore, more generally able individuals are
more likely to prefer a second skill under a significant cost complementarity and less likely to
prefer a second skill in the absence of one, relative to their peers in specific-ability balance,
and for a given level of perceived uncertainty. Finally, individuals of greater specific-ability
balance will tend to prefer a greater number of skills than before as the cost per skill falls.
In conjunction with these theoretical inferences, the empirical results suggest that cost
complementarities are present for UNC graduates. More generally able students are more likely
to graduate with two majors, though ability balance does not appear to play an important role
in determining the number of majors for this sample. However, the analysis also indicates that
the most generally able students and the most balanced students are likely to be among the
most specialized in their undergraduate investments, as measured by the average number of
courses that they take in any given department. As a result, greater ability in either dimension
does not necessarily translate into a more diverse acquired skill set.
Thus, the empirical results suggest that ability balance may be much less important than
general ability in determining the number of high-level, marketable skills that students acquire,
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because the most generally able individuals benefit most from cost complementarities in the
skill acquisition process. However, these results also suggest that the theoretical intuitions
that more generally able individuals have less incentive to invest broadly and that the most
balanced individuals may make a more specialized investment appear reasonable in the more
general context of all the courses that students choose to take while in school. Therefore,
the theoretical model appears to capture at least some of the trade-offs that UNC students
consider in practice.
In addition, the empirical results suggest that changes in economic conditions have played
an important role in determining the fraction of students graduating with a second major.
Cohort effects, which should proxy for perceived uncertainty and other labor market factors,
have increasingly contributed to the likelihood of a double major over time.
Because both abilities and perceived uncertainty contribute to the likelihood of a double
major, a reasonable explanation of why the fraction of students in universities across the
country graduating with multiple major or degrees has been increasing recently involves two
factors. The results of the theoretical and empirical analyses presented here suggest that this
trend can be explained as resulting from both an increase in mean SAT scores over time and
the response of the most generally able students to increases in their perceived future wage
uncertainty. The most generally able benefit most from cost complementarities and are thus
most likely to invest in multiple skills when given sufficient incentive in the form of anticipated
labor market uncertainty.
Finally, the empirical analysis suggests that men and women may have fundamentally
different skill investment patterns. Both genders are more likely to acquire two majors when
they are more generally able, but the brightest women will tend to acquire two majors that
are increasingly similar, while the reverse is true for the smartest men. Women tend to make a
more diverse investment overall, and only for them is ability balance an important determinant
of their overall degree of specialization. These interesting differences may very well reflect or
predetermine observed gender differences in labor market outcomes.
This analysis should be of interest to educated workers, educators, and politicians. It
suggests that recent changes in the skilled labor market have caused some students to change
9
the way that they invest in skills at the undergraduate level, and that abilities have played
a considerable role in determining which students are best able to adapt to such changes. In
particular, this analysis suggests not only that students of higher abilities are more likely to
weather labor market risk, by virtue of their greater tendency to invest in multiple skills at a
high level, but also consequently that a double major or joint degree is likely to be a strong
market signal of ability in the same way that a graduate degree is a signal of ability. This
selection among students may influence which job candidates employers prefer. Moreover,
because students tend to select into more- or less-lucrative majors or major combinations
based in large part on their abilities at matriculation, and because these abilities appear to
constrain the skill investment options that are available to students, policy should encourage
students to improve their fundamental math and verbal skills before they enter college.
1.4 Layout of the Paper
The next two chapters present the theoretical model and an overview of the theoretical results.
Chapters 4 and 5 similarly present the empirical framework, discuss the data, and then present
the empirical results, along with a discussion of the implications of the theory and the empirical
results for UNC students. Chapter 6 concludes and suggests directions for both policy and
future research.
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Chapter 2
Theoretical Framework
2.1 Basic Model
2.1.1 Overview
The model is the optimization problem of an individual whose objective function has three
independent components:
• a benefit from investment in skill level that increases with general ability and decreases
with uncertainty
• if more than one skill is acquired, a bounded benefit from investment in skill diversity
that depends inversely only on the similarity of these skills
• a quadratic cost from skill investment that increases in the number, level, and diversity
of skills acquired, and that depends on the ability profile of the individual
In particular, to allow for closed-form solutions, I assume that both the total benefit from skill
investment and the total cost from the same are separable in the individual’s choice variables.
In consequence, it is also possible to think of the overall objective function, or total surplus,
of the individual as simply the sum of two independent expressions:
• the surplus from skill level (benefit less cost in the “vertical” skill dimension)
• the surplus from skill diversity (benefit less cost in the “horizontal” skill dimension)
The individual maximizes his total surplus from skill acquisition by choosing the charac-
teristics of his skills. In particular, he chooses their number, level, and diversity, given the
level of his perceived uncertainty. He makes these choices and acquires these skills before he
enters the skilled labor market.
2.1.2 Skills
Individuals may acquire zero1, one, or two skills. The space of acquirable skills is represented
by the outer surface, above the (x, y)-plane, of a cylinder of radius 1, which is illustrated in
Figure 2.1.5.
In particular, for any given skill level (λ), which increases continuously2 along the z-axis,
skills form a continuum around the circumference of the unit-circle cross-section of the cylinder
at that level. For example, at the level of a bachelor’s degree from a particular institution,
the various majors may be placed on the perimeter of the circle in such a way that the prox-
imity of various skills to one another indicates their diversity, or degree of similarity. In other
words, biology and chemistry may fall relatively close together on the circle, while biology and
the Chinese language may be rather farther apart. Skills diametrically opposed are the least
similar.
2.1.3 Individuals
Individuals are located within the cylinder and are characterized by three parameters:
• specific-ability balance (v)
• skill preference (θ)
1Individuals acquiring zero skills presumably take unskilled employment if they participate in the labor force.
2The assumption of a continuous choice space derives from the observation that even educational institutions
providing the same nominal credentials, such as the bachelor’s degree, vary greatly in the quality of the degrees
they provide. For example, an A.B. from Harvard is not the same as a B.A. from Kalamazoo College. Therefore,
one may argue that individuals effectively face a continuum of level choices when they select both their desired
credential and which school to attend.
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• general ability (g)
All other factors that may influence skill choice are assumed constant across workers and
otherwise conducive to skill acquisition.
The skill preference parameter θ simply indicates an individual’s most preferred skill; for
example, an individual may have a strong natural interest in and facility for history. A high
value of g corresponds to high general ability, but a high value of v indicates low specific-ability
balance. Possible empirical interpretations of g and v are, respectively, general intelligence and
balance in the associated intellectual group factors (e.g., verbal, mathematical, spatial, etc.);
other real-world interpretations may be possible. Both v and g are normalized within the open
interval (0,1), while θ varies between zero and 2pi. In short, the location of the individual in
three-space is given in Cartesian coordinates by (v cos(θ), v sin(θ), g).
2.1.4 Cost of skill acquisition
I assume that an individual’s cost of acquiring a particular skill is the square of the distance
from that individual’s location within the cylinder to that of his chosen skill on the cylinder’s
surface. More formally, making use of the distance formula for three dimensions, the cost Cij
of skill θij of level λij is given by
Cij = (cos(θij)− v cos(θ))2 + (sin(θij)− v sin(θ))2 + (λij − g)2 (2.1)
where the index i = 1, 2 denotes the total number of skills acquired by the individual and the
index j = 1, 2 indicates one of these skills in particular. Moreover, two aspects of the assumed
relationship between individual location and skill cost are worthy of note.
First, an individual of a given level of g finds it costly to under-invest in education level.
For example, someone ordinarily destined to become a research biologist may find the work of a
janitor unsatisfactory from the point of view of mental stimulation. Similarly, over-investment
is also costly. For example, one may reasonably imagine that a student who struggles to
complete a bachelor’s degree may end up working in a position not requiring the credential.
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Second, skill cost is increasing in specific-ability balance. That is, individuals near the
center of the cylinder find it more costly to acquire their most preferred skill θ than do indi-
viduals who are less balanced and are located closer to the perimeter. However, more balanced
individuals find all skills of a given level more similar in cost, and thus have a weaker innate
skill preference, than do individuals who are less balanced. This trade-off between absolute
and relative skill costs across individuals of differing specific-ability balance makes sense if one
notes that more balanced individuals may face a higher cost of skill acquisition than their less
balanced peers in general ability.
In other words, note that more balanced individuals have the potential to be competent at
everything to a more similar degree than do their less balanced peers. Therefore, they are more
likely to make mistakes when selecting the particular skills in which they invest, simply because
they have more options. Moreover, anticipation of this fact may cause them to be indecisive or
seek to avoid a decision entirely. For example, not only do more balanced individuals anticipate
that the skill with the highest future wage realization is unlikely to coincide with any given
skill that they will have chosen, but they also know that they have sufficiently broad abilities
to find the acquisition of the future optimal skill quite feasible in the present, if they could
only somehow know in advance what that will be. Thus, the specific-ability balance of an
individual may be construed as the likelihood that he will regret any given skill investment
decision. Such anticipated regret is a potentially large psychic cost.3
In short, the cost structure of the model is designed primarily to capture two ideas. First,
an individual should find it least costly to acquire those skills for which he is best suited. In
this respect, individuals find it costly to over-invest or under-invest in education level rela-
tive to their level of general ability, as well as to deviate greatly from their most salient skill
preference, or talent. Second, the very existence of a choice among multiple alternatives may
impose costs on the chooser. Specific-ability balance reduces the cost of acquiring less similar
3I ask the skeptical reader whether, when faced with a choice among a variety of mutually exclusive options,
he or someone he knows has ever substantially delayed or even entirely avoided making a decision, simply for
fear of making a mistake. Schwartz (2004) notes not only that anticipated regret frequently causes indecision
or decision avoidance, but also that the anticipated regret of individuals is likely to be greater when they face
a greater number of options.
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skills but also raises the reference point relative to which any given skill investment must be
evaluated.
2.1.5 Benefit of skill acquisition
I normalize the benefit from acquiring zero skills to zero, and I assume that the benefit Bi to
the individual who acquires a positive number i of skills is
B1 =
gλ11
σ
(2.2)
in the case that he acquires one skill4, and
B2 =
g(λ21 + λ22)
2σ
+
δ
pi
(2.3)
in the case that he acquires two, where σ denotes perceived idiosyncratic labor demand uncer-
tainty,5 δ denotes skill diversity and corresponds to the length of the arc between the two skills
on the circle, and pi ≈ 3.14 represents itself. The expression B1 is simply the benefit from skill
level investment for one skill. Similarly, the first term in the expression B2 is the benefit to
skill level investment when two skills are acquired, while the second term is the benefit from
investment in skill diversity, or from the dissimilarity of the two skills. Moreover, three aspects
of the assumed benefit functions are worthy of note.
First, I assume that the return to skill level investment is greater when the individual
is more generally able. This assumption is justifiable in light of evidence suggesting that
more generally intelligent individuals are more productive, more trainable because they learn
faster, and have better job performance.6 Thus, g may be viewed as a normalized productivity
4Jensen (1998) suggests that an individual’s developed general ability is theoretically the product of in-
nate general ability (g) and education. Therefore, if we assume that the labor market compensates a worker
in a manner commensurate with his level of developed ability, then it seems reasonable also to assume this
multiplicative form of the market return to an individual’s level of schooling.
5Unemployment corresponds to a wage of zero.
6See Jensen (1998).
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parameter that is proportionately compensated.
Second, I assume that perceived uncertainty is constant across skills, so σ may be thought
of as the average idiosyncratic wage dispersion across occupations. For example, if outsourcing
and technological change were to cause the variance of compensation in every occupation to
increase due to better sorting in the labor market, this would correspond to a global increase
in idiosyncratic skill investment risk. Moreover, such an increase need not necessarily translate
into increased systemic, or market, risk.7 Thus, any given skill investment would be inherently
more risky, but this risk would be partly diversifiable. In short, changes in σ are meant to
capture exogenous, systemic changes in diversifiable uncertainty.
Third, the benefit from an individual’s chosen skill diversity, the second term in B2, is
normalized relative to the maximum possible diversity, which occurs when δ = pi. The benefit
from diversity thus falls between 0 and 1. As a result, skill diversity becomes relatively more
important in the individual’s benefit function as uncertainty increases but becomes relatively
less so when employment outcomes are more certain. Moreover, implicit in the assumption
that the benefit from diversity is bounded is the supposition that partial diversification of
the risk associated with two particular skills can compensate only to a limited degree for
the negative impact that such risk generally has on an individual’s benefit from skill level
investment. Finally, the particular normalization scale chosen for diversity, in conjunction
with that for specific-ability balance, creates a situation in which the benefit from diversity
will, for at least some individuals, cover the balance-derived cost of at most one skill. In other
words, it seems reasonable that the surplus from skill diversity investment, in and of itself,
should not provide all individuals with a sufficient incentive to acquire multiple skills in those
cases in which the surplus from skill level investment is negligible.
In the interest of model simplicity and tractability, I do not directly consider the mecha-
nism by which workers find and retain employment. Rather, I intend the benefit portion of an
individual’s objective function to be a static, reduced-form representation of what is in reality
7On a related note, Campbell, Lettau, Malkiel, and Xu (2001) show for the case of the US stock market that
the (weighted-) average level of idiosyncratic risk can change over time independently of any significant changes
in market risk. Such an occurrence corresponds to a relative shift toward idiosyncratic risk in the determination
of overall investment risk.
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a dynamic and more complicated process. However, this formulation is not entirely unrealistic,
in the sense that workers are unlikely to have specific and detailed knowledge about all of the
various factors that may influence their future job and wage stability. Therefore, it is sufficient
to note that uncertainty in the form of increased aggregate wage dispersion should decrease
the expected benefit from employment when the worker is risk-averse, and that diversification
in this context should be beneficial. Both of these effects are captured by the model. Finally,
and more importantly, this simple benefit function allows focus to be placed explicitly on skill
choice patterns as they depend on ability and perceived uncertainty.8
8In response to the questions of several of my colleagues, a few general comments about the origin of the
model are in order. It is largely my own creation and derives only indirectly from any previous economic theory
of which I am aware. That is, I was unable to find any established framework that could be adjusted easily to
accommodate skill choice in three dimensions while also capturing the cost trade-off imposed by specific-ability
balance. The choice of the functional form of the cost function and the choice of a spatial framework (as opposed
to a non-spatial one) to represent the continuum of acquirable skills were admittedly inspired in part by the
spatial product differentiation literature, including the work of Hotelling and Salop. However, the particular
geometry chosen was selected primarily because I think that a circle, as compared with other geometric figures,
best captures this trade-off. In addition, the benefit function reached its current state after I made many
attempts to allow for interdependence between the benefits from level and diversity of skill investment; it was
my experience that such interdependence generally precludes closed-form solutions.
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Figure 2.1: Individuals and Skills
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2.2 Extended Model
2.2.1 Overview
In the basic model outlined above, the cost per skill is independent of the number of skills
acquired. In particular, the individual optimally choosing two skills in the context of the basic
model chooses the level and diversity of his skills to maximize his surplus, which is given by
S2 = B2 − C21 − C22 (2.4)
where Si denotes the surplus from acquiring i skills.
However, the observation has frequently been made that skill acquisition exhibits comple-
mentarities. In other words, those individuals who invest in non-compulsory education tend
to do so repeatedly. Moreover, the more educational investment a given individual has already
made, the greater the likelihood that he will make further such investments. In short, some-
thing about the learning process feeds on itself in such a way that learning leads to learning;
human capital is its own input and enhances the productivity of its own production.9
With this observation in mind, the extended model allows for a cost complementarity across
skills when more than one is acquired.10 In particular, I assume that the cost function may
change in each of two ways. First, the fixed cost of each skill may vary with the total number
of skills acquired. Specifically, the cost per skill may be lower when two skills are acquired
simultaneously, as in the cases of a double major or a joint degree program; this type of cost
complementarity may be viewed as an economy-of-scope. Second, the cost of a given skill may
vary with the order in which skills are acquired, if these skills are obtained in tandem. In
9For discussions and empirical evidence, see Jenkins, Vignoles, Wolfe, and Galindo-Rueda (2003) and Cunha,
Heckman, Lochner, and Masterov (2005).
10The assumption of a unit radius in the basic model can be relaxed by considering an arbitrary radius r.
Doing so reduces the relative difference in skill costs for individuals of different ability balance if r < 1. In this
case, some of the most balanced individuals (those with v ≤ 1
2pir
) will acquire more than one skill. However, for
r ≥ 1, none of the most balanced individuals prefer two skills to one. Relaxing the assumption of a unit radius
in this way provides results that are very similar to those of the extended model, as r pre-multiplies components
of the cost function, as does γ. Thus, the extended model can also be interpreted as essentially a relaxation of
the unit radius assumption, for r ≤ 1.
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particular, if an individual becomes more adept at learning in the course of his initial skill
acquisition, then a second skill may be less costly; this type of cost complementarity may be
interpreted as an instance of learning-by-doing.
More specifically, the extended model incorporates a cost complementarity parameter
γ ∈ (0, 1), which becomes relevant only when two skills are acquired. This parameter is
inversely related to the extent to which the cost per skill falls as the number of skills acquired
increases from one to two. Note in what follows that γ = 1 would correspond to the case of
the basic model. Therefore, the extension provides a more general analysis than does the basic
framework.
2.2.2 Economy-of-scope
If an individual acquires two skills, he obtains them simultaneously. In so doing, he chooses
the level and diversity of these skills to maximize his surplus, which is now given by
SA2 = B2 − γC21 − γC22 (2.5)
In this case, the cost of each skill is reduced by the complementarity.
2.2.3 Learning-by-doing
If an individual acquires two skills, he obtains them in sequence, one immediately after the
other, but still prior to entering the skilled labor market for the first time. In so doing, he
chooses the level and diversity of his skills to maximize his surplus, which is now given by
SB2 = B2 − C21 − γC22 (2.6)
In this case, only the cost of the second skill is reduced by the complementarity.
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2.2.4 Interpretation of γ as linked to g
Many real-world interpretations of γ are undoubtedly possible. For example, overlap in the
courses required for various degree programs might be one such interpretation. However, it
seems reasonable, especially in the context of sequential choice, to ask whether γ might actually
be inversely related to g, and thus variable across individuals. In particular, if we continue to
interpret g as representing general intelligence, narrowly defined, then g is essentially a measure
of an individual’s ability to learn, to think abstractly, and to draw meaningful conclusions
quickly. As such, it should be expected to impact the capacity of an individual to earn
multiple credentials at once, and to learn how to learn.
I examine the implications of this possibility by reinterpreting the cases of economy-of-scope
and learning-by-doing after letting γ = 1 − g. This modification of the model is interesting
primarily because it relaxes the assumption of the independence of the two skill investment
margins, namely level and diversity, with regard to the relevance of the ability endowments to
each. A high level of general ability now influences the cost of diversity, as well as those of
number and level.
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Chapter 3
Analytic Results
3.1 Primary analytic results – skill number
In the course of deriving solutions to both the basic and extended models1
for representative individuals (θ = 0), I characterize the optimal choice of skill number relative
to each individual’s location on the v-continuum. (Recall that v ∈ (0, 1) is inversely related to
specific-ability balance.) More specifically, I define several v-cutoffs, which are functions2 of g
and σ, that indicate the regions of v in which individuals prefer a specific number of skills.
3.1.1 Basic model
In the case of the basic model, the analysis indicates that it is appropriate to define the
following five v-cutoffs:
• vˆ01, where 0 ≤ vˆ01 ≤ 1:
Individuals prefer one skill to none if v > vˆ01. Otherwise, they prefer zero skills to one.
• vˆ12 and vˆ21, where 12pi ≤ vˆ12 ≤ vˆ21 ≤ 1:
Individuals prefer two skills to one if vˆ12 < v < vˆ21 Otherwise, they prefer one skill to
1Formal results and proofs are provided in Appendix I.
2Though it is straightforward to determine the behavior of these cutoffs, it is possible to provide a closed-form
expression for only the first of those defined below. For this reason, I omit specific functional forms.
two.
• vˆ20 and vˆ02, where 12pi ≤ vˆ20 ≤ vˆ02 ≤ 1:
Individuals with v ≥ 12pi prefer two skills to none3 if either v < vˆ20 or v > vˆ02. Otherwise,
they prefer zero skills to two.
The first of these cutoffs indicates that less balanced (higher-v) individuals are more likely to
prefer one skill to none. The second and third cutoffs (second bullet point) above indicate that
individuals of intermediate to low specific-ability balance are most likely to prefer two skills to
one, while the third and fourth cutoffs (third bullet point) above suggest that those of lowest
and highest specific-ability balance are most likely to prefer two skills to none, given that they
may at any time prefer two to one. Possible relative placements of these cutoffs along the
v-continuum are illustrated in Figure 3.1.1.
It is noteworthy that the most balanced individuals, namely those with v < 12pi , never
acquire two skills, as they never prefer two skills to one. Intuitively, this result obtains because
the marginal surplus from level in the acquisition of a second skill is always negative in the
basic model. For this reason, two skills are preferred to one only when the marginal surplus
from diversity is sufficiently large to make the total marginal surplus positive, which never
occurs for the most balanced individuals.
Furthermore, the behavior of these five cutoffs depends on g and σ as follows:
• vˆ01 decreases in g and increases in σ:
∂vˆ01
∂g
< 0,
∂vˆ01
∂σ
> 0
• vˆ12 and vˆ21 converge as g increases and σ decreases but diverge when the reverse is true:
∂vˆ12
∂g
> 0,
∂vˆ21
∂g
< 0,
∂vˆ12
∂σ
< 0,
∂vˆ21
∂σ
> 0
3Individuals with v < 1
2pi
always prefer one skill to two. Therefore, they always acquire either one skill or
none. For this reason, I consider a choice between zero and two skills only for those individuals who may at
some time find it desirable to acquire two skills.
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• vˆ20 and vˆ02 converge as g increases and σ decreases but diverge when the reverse is true:
∂vˆ20
∂g
> 0,
∂vˆ02
∂g
< 0,
∂vˆ20
∂σ
< 0,
∂vˆ02
∂σ
> 0
In consequence, the fraction of individuals who prefer one skill to none is larger when general
ability is higher and perceived uncertainty is lower. Similarly, the fraction of individuals who
prefer two skills to one is larger when g is lower and σ is higher, while the fraction of individuals
who prefer two skills to none, given that they may at some time prefer two skills to one, is
larger when g is higher and σ is lower.
In particular, the marginal surplus from the level of a second skill decreases in g and
increases in σ. For this reason, two skills are less likely to be attractive, relative to one, when
g is high and σ is low.
The relative positions of these five cutoffs are of interest in determining the overall skill
acquisition pattern across individuals. Moreover, since g is normalized between 0 and 1, these
relative positions depend primarily on the value of σ. At extremely low uncertainty (σ → 0),
it follows that
0 = vˆ01 < vˆ20 = vˆ02 < vˆ12 = vˆ21 < 1
In this case, all individuals find it worthwhile to acquire one skill, though none face sufficient
incentive to acquire two. The absolute value of the negative marginal surplus from level
investment in a second skill is particularly large for low uncertainty, since individuals optimally
invest in a higher level of skill when uncertainty is low, and it thus swamps the potential gain
that workers would derive from a greater breadth of competence. Therefore, they all opt for
full specialization.
In contrast, at extremely high uncertainty (σ →∞), it follows that
0 < vˆ20 < vˆ12 < vˆ02 < vˆ21 = vˆ01 = 1
Therefore, at the highest levels of uncertainty, individuals of high specific-ability balance ac-
quire no skills, while those of lowest specific-ability balance all acquire two. Those who do
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choose to invest in human capital prefer two skills to none but would find investment in any
one skill insufficiently rewarding. Acquiring one skill at such high uncertainty is costly but
provides no benefit. In fact, no individual acquires exactly one skill in this case.
A variety of intermediate skill acquisition patterns exist relative to these two limiting cases.
In particular, simulations indicate that the skill acquisition pattern, from individuals of highest
to lowest specific-ability balance, generally does proceed from zero skills, to one, to two, for
intermediate values of uncertainty. These simulation results are presented in Appendix II.
Thus, the primary qualitative predictions of the basic model in the case of high perceived
uncertainty4 may be summarized as follows:
• Individuals of greater specific-ability balance tend to acquire fewer skills.
• Individuals of higher general ability are more likely to acquire a positive number of skills
but are also more likely to specialize fully.
• Therefore, those individuals who are observed to acquire multiple skills should be those
who are less balanced and less generally able.
3.1.2 Extended model
As the results are qualitatively similar for both the economy-of-scope and learning-by-doing,
I discuss only the first of these cases. The purpose of the extended analysis is to demonstrate
that the most balanced individuals do find it optimal to acquire two skills in some cases.
This result contrasts with that of the basic model, which suggests that the most balanced
individuals never acquire two skills. I therefore restrict attention only to the set of most
balanced individuals.
Despite this restriction, the skill number choice results derived for the extended model are
considerably more general than those for the basic model. In particular, the effects of general
4I emphasize the results for high perceived uncertainty, because this case is currently likely to be most
relevant empirically. As noted earlier, empirical evidence suggests not only that wage dispersion has recently
increased among skilled workers, but also that at least some workers view this increased wage uncertainty as a
reason to diversify their skills.
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ability, specific-ability balance, and uncertainty on the number of skills acquired are no longer
monotonic.
Moreover, note that the analogous set of the “most balanced” individuals for the economy-
of-scope now comprises those with v < 12piγ , rather than simply those with v <
1
2pi . However,
the latter case is subsumed in the former, given that γ < 1 by definition. Thus, the results
for this case are potentially relevant not only for those with v < 12pi , but for all v ∈ (0, 1),
depending on the value of γ.
In the extended model, as in the basic model, it is appropriate to define indifference cutoffs
that indicate the regions in which individuals prefer a specific number of skills. In particular,
the cutoff vˆ01 from the basic model remains relevant, since the presence of a cost complemen-
tarity only influences individual choices concerning the acquisition of two skills. I define the
following two additional cutoffs for the economy-of-scope:
• vˆA21, where 0 ≤ vˆA21 ≤ 12piγ :
Individuals with v < 12piγ prefer two skills to one if v < vˆ
A
21. Otherwise, they prefer one
skill to two.
• vˆA20, where 0 ≤ vˆA20 ≤ 12piγ :
Individuals with v < 12piγ prefer two skills to none if v < vˆ
A
20. Otherwise, they prefer zero
skills to two.
The first of these cutoffs is relevant for γ > 12 and sufficiently high uncertainty. More
specifically, all of the most balanced individuals prefer two skills to one if the cost comple-
mentarity is sufficiently great
(
γ ≤ 12
)
. Intuitively, the marginal surplus from the second skill
is always positive for the most balanced individuals in this case, in contrast with that of the
basic model.
In addition, for γ > 12 , if uncertainty is low, then all of the most balanced individuals prefer
one skill to two, as they face insufficient incentive to diversify. The marginal surplus from level
in this case is large and negative, dominating the marginal surplus from diversity when it is
positive.
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However, those individuals with v < 12piγ prefer two skills to one under high uncertainty in
this case. For these individuals, the marginal surplus from diversity is positive, and that from
level is negative but sufficiently small in absolute value not to deter investment. Finally, as γ →
1, which was considered for the basic model, no value of σ induces these individuals to acquire
two skills, as the marginal cost is simply too large in the absence of a cost complementarity.
The second of these cutoffs is relevant for all values of γ ∈ (0, 1). However, if γ > 12 , then
uncertainty must be sufficiently low in order for a positive value of this cutoff to exist. That
is, if the cost complementarity is low and uncertainty is high, then none of the most balanced
individuals prefer two skills to zero, because the absolute cost per skill is too high relative
to the benefit from two. In contrast, when uncertainty is low, two skills become attractive
relative to none.
More explicitly, the behavior of these cutoffs, given that they exist, depends on g, σ, and
γ as follows:
• vˆA21 decreases in g and γ and increases in σ:
∂vˆA21
∂g
< 0,
∂vˆA21
∂σ
> 0,
∂vˆA21
∂γ
< 0
• vˆA20 increases in g and decreases in σ and γ:
∂vˆA20
∂g
> 0,
∂vˆA20
∂σ
< 0,
∂vˆA20
∂γ
< 0
As before, it is possible to examine the limiting behavior of these cutoffs under different
extremes of perceived uncertainty. However, the skill acquisition pattern of the most balanced
individuals also now depends on the magnitude of the cost complementarity. For γ < 12 ,
all of the most balanced individuals prefer two skills to one or zero, regardless of the level
of perceived uncertainty.5 In contrast, when γ ≥ 12 , none of the most balanced individuals
5This result should be interpreted with caution. For the economy-of-scope discussed here, very low γ will
imply, for some individuals, that the total cost of acquiring two skills is less than that of acquiring one. However,
the results of this subsection are qualitatively similar to those for the case of learning-by-doing, so the qualitative
implications provided here are representative.
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acquire two skills. Under low uncertainty, they face insufficient incentive to diversify, while,
under very high uncertainty, the marginal benefit from skill level is simply too small relative
to the cost of the second skill. These results are consistent with those derived from the basic
model, in that none of the most balanced individuals acquire two skills as γ approaches 1.
However, it is clear that alternative cases do exist when γ falls sufficiently.
More generally, the intuition underlying skill investment patterns for all individuals is
as follows. The least balanced are the most likely to face a positive marginal surplus from
diversity, because a very unbalanced individual acquiring his most-preferred skill faces a lower
cost per skill than would a more balanced individual acquiring that same skill. In the presence
of a significant cost complementarity, the set of those with a positive marginal surplus from
diversity expands to include the most balanced individuals, because the marginal surplus from
diversity is not linear in v. Those of intermediate specific-ability balance follow as the cost
complementarity increases. Furthermore, all individuals generally face a negative marginal
surplus from level in the absence of a significant cost complementarity. However, as the cost
complementarity increases, this marginal surplus becomes positive for all individuals. The
absolute value of the marginal level surplus term increases with general ability. Therefore,
more generally able individuals are more likely to prefer a second skill under a significant
cost complementarity and less likely to prefer a second skill in the absence of one, relative to
their peers in specific-ability balance, and for a given level of perceived uncertainty. Finally,
individuals of greater specific-ability balance will tend to prefer a greater number of skills than
before as the cost per skill falls, so it follows simply that the presence of a significant cost
complementarity is, in fact, sufficient to induce a greater fraction of individuals to acquire
multiple skills under high uncertainty.
As a supplement to the analytic results discussed above, simulations can be used to demon-
strate that this intuition holds for the entire spectrum of individual profiles. A variety of such
simulations for this case also are provided in Appendix II.
In summary, the extended model implies the following more general results for the case of
high perceived uncertainty:
29
• Individuals of lesser specific-ability balance are most likely to acquire multiple skills.
However, those of greater specific-ability balance may be more likely than those of in-
termediate specific-ability balance to acquire multiple skills, depending on the extent to
which the cost per skill falls as the number of skills acquired increases.
• Individuals of higher general ability are more likely to acquire a positive number of skills
but may be either more or less likely to specialize fully, depending on the extent to which
the cost per skill falls as the number of skills acquired increases.
• Therefore, those individuals who are observed to acquire multiple skills should be those
who are either most or least balanced and either most or least generally able. Moreover,
an observed positive relation between either specific-ability balance or general ability and
skill number would suggest that the cost per skill falls as the number of skills acquired
increases.
3.2 Secondary analytic results – skill level and diversity
Several additional implications obtain with regard to the optimal choices of skill level and
diversity. First, for both the basic and extended models, the optimal level of skill acquired
increases in general ability and decreases in uncertainty:
∂λ∗ij
∂g
> 0,
∂λ∗ij
∂σ
< 0,
for all i = 1, 2 and j = 1, 2. Second, also in both models, if two skills are acquired optimally,
the diversity of those skills increases in specific-ability balance:
∂δ∗
∂v
< 0,
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for those individuals who do not find maximum diversity (pi) optimal. Finally, in the case of the
extended model, optimal skill level and diversity both increase in the cost complementarity:
∂λ∗2j
∂γ
< 0,
∂δ∗
∂γ
< 0,
for j = 1, 2.
Thus, as should be expected, more generally able individuals optimally acquire a higher
level of skill; more balanced individuals optimally acquire a greater diversity of skills if they
acquire more than one; and the level and diversity of skills acquired tends to be greater when a
marginal skill is less costly. These results come primarily from the assumptions that I originally
made about the functional form of the benefit function.
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Figure 3.1: Ability cutoffs and preferences for the basic model
Preferences for one skill vs. zero skills
most balanced least balanced
0 vˆ01 1
b 0  1 cb 1  0 c
Preferences for two skills vs. one skill
most balanced least balanced
0 12pi vˆ12 vˆ21 1
b 1  2 cb 1  2 cb 2  1 cb 1  2 c
Preferences for two skills vs. zero skills for v > 12pi
most balanced least balanced
0 12pi vˆ20 vˆ02 1
b 2  0 cb 0  2 cb 2  0 c
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Chapter 4
Data and Empirical Framework
4.1 Description of the Data
4.1.1 Overview
The full data sample comprises student-level information for 17,099 individuals1 who graduated
from UNC-Chapel Hill with a bachelor’s degree between 1999 and 2006. About half of these
individuals were born during or after 1980, though birth years in the sample span the period
from 1975 to 1985. The mean age at graduation was 22. Most of the individuals (81%) were
residents of North Carolina when they began attending UNC-Chapel Hill. Women comprise
about 63% of the sample, and 81% of the sample is White. Blacks and Asians make up 11%
and 5% of the sample, respectively. The graduates are relatively evenly distributed across
graduation years, except for 1999, which is the first year for which any data are available.
In addition to demographic information, such as race, gender, age, and residency status,
complete transcript data are available for these individuals. Specifically, the data contain
information about all courses taken and grades received, as well as major field declarations,
for each semester of enrollment at UNC-Chapel Hill. On average, the individuals in the sample
took fewer than 3 courses in any given department but took a total of 38 courses for graduation.
1I exclude individuals who were missing SAT scores, were classified as graduate students, transferred to
UNC after their freshman year, or were more than 25 years of age at graduation. These restrictions remove
cases where ability is not known and allow focus to be placed on ’traditional’ undergraduates. These exclusions
reduce the sample size from 25,497 to 17,099.
Of these 38 courses, approximately 17 fell within students’ major fields.2 In addition, these
students placed out of 8 courses, took 31 courses below the 100-level3, and took 6 courses at
or above the 100-level on average.
Unfortunately, income, tuition, and family background information is not available for the
majority of these individuals. However, an internal survey was administered to the classes
of 2003-2006 assessing four items: whether or not financial aid was received, joint parental
income, paternal educational attainment, and maternal educational attainment. Complete
unit responses to the survey are available for 4,540 individuals, or 27% of the sample.
Of those students who completed the survey, 63% said that they had received financial aid.
A majority of the survey completers reported that their fathers had earned graduate degrees
(39%) and that their mothers had completed college (42%) or graduate school (28%). A third
of students reported parental income in the range of $30,000-$75,000, while approximately 20%
of students reported parental incomes in each of the three higher income categories: between
$75,000 and $100,000, between $100,000 and $150,000, and above $150,000.
More specifically, the data include the following primary variables:
• Two Majors: A dummy variable indicating the number of distinct majors declared
during the last semester of enrollment prior to graduation. Equal to 1 if two majors and
0 otherwise.
• Initial Residency Status: dummy variable indicating residency during the first semester
of enrollment. Equal to 1 if resident and 0 otherwise.
• Year of Birth: The student’s year of birth.
• White, Asian, Black, Other: dummy variables indicating ethnicity. Each is equal to
1 if the individual is of the corresponding ethnicity and 0 otherwise.
2The number of courses and fraction within major fields have remained relatively stable during the time
period considered, so it is unlikely that any changes in course requirements have contributed to the recent
increase in double majors.
3All undergraduate courses at UNC prior to the curriculum change of 2006 were categorized at the 100-level
or below. Courses at the 200-level or above were graduate level.
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• Ability Balance: the absolute value of the difference between SAT verbal and math
scores. Smaller values indicate greater specific-ability balance.
• Normalized Ability Balance: a normalized version of the ability balance measure
that is scaled based on the full sample to fall between 0 and 1.
• General Ability: the average of SAT verbal and math scores. Larger values indicate
greater general ability.
• Normalized General Ability a normalized version of the general ability measure that
is scaled based on the full sample to fall between 0 and 1.
• Male: dummy variable indicating gender. Equal to 1 if male and 0 otherwise.
• Grad Year: A class variable indicating the year of graduation.
• Grade Point Average: The student’s GPA at graduation.
• Total Courses Taken: The total number of courses taken at UNC in which the student
received a standard course grade greater than F. (Standard grades include A+, A, A-,
B+, B, etc.)
• Courses Required for Majors: The total minimum number of core courses required
by the major field departments for the major or majors selected. This measure takes
into account any overlap in required courses when two majors are chosen.
• Courses Placed Out: The number of courses exempted by either advanced placement
or examination.
• Transcript Index: The average number of courses taken by the student in any given
department.4
• Upper Level Courses: The number of courses taken at the 100-level or above.
4The number of departments in which courses were taken and the transcript index have a highly significant
correlation of -.70, regardless of whether the full sample or the survey sample is considered. Therefore, the
transcript index tends to be higher when the number of departments in which courses are taken is smaller. The
remaining variation derives from the fact that students graduate with different numbers of courses overall.
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• Lower Level Courses: The number of courses taken below the 100-level.
• Received Financial Aid: A survey dummy variable indicating whether the student
received financial aid.
• Parental Income: A categorical survey variable indicating joint parental income.
• Father’s Education: A categorical survey variable indicating the educational attain-
ment of the father.
• Mother’s Education: A categorical survey variable indicating the educational attain-
ment of the mother.
Summary statistics for the numeric variables, for both the full sample and for survey
completers, and for both genders, are presented in Tables 4.1-4.6 below. Table 4.7 presents a
test of means for the full sample versus the set of survey completers. In addition, Table 4.8
presents unweighted frequencies for the survey variables for the complete survey cases.
As can be seen from these tables, important differences exist in the characteristics of survey
completers relative to those of the full sample. Specifically, survey participants are more likely
to have been residents upon matriculation and to have graduated recently (by virtue of when
the survey was administered). In addition, survey respondents were nearly a year younger at
graduation, placed out of more courses, exhibited higher measured general ability and ability
balance, graduated with higher GPAs, and were more likely to have a double major.
In addition, student characteristics vary systematically by gender, and in the same direc-
tions, within each of these two samples. On average, men have higher general ability but
lower ability balance and a lower GPA than women. In addition, the men are more likely to
be White and tend to place out of more courses and take more upper level courses than the
women, though both groups take about the same number of courses overall and achieve similar
degrees of specialization as measured by the transcript index. Men in the survey sample are
slightly more likely than women to double major, but the overall fraction of double majors is
close across genders.
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Table 4.9 presents the correlations among the four survey variables. Receipt of financial aid
is inversely related to the other family background measures. Income and parental education
move in the same direction, as expected, and this relationship is strongest for the father’s
education.
Finally, Table 4.10 presents a summary of how the normalized ability measures and the
fraction of students with two majors has evolved over time at UNC. Normalized general ability
and the proportion with two majors have increased together from graduating class to gradua-
tion class, from 0.54 to 0.67 and from 20% to 28%, respectively. However, normalized ability
balance has remained relatively stable, at around 0.15.
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Table 4.1: Summary Statistics for All Students (N=17,099)
Variable Mean Std Dev Min Max
Initial Residency Status 0.81 0.40 0 1
Year of Birth 1981 2.11 1975 1985
Age at Grad 22.33 0.67 19 25
White 0.81 0.40 0 1
Asian 0.05 0.22 0 1
Black 0.11 0.31 0 1
Other 0.03 0.18 0 1
Ability Balance 58.63 46.03 0 370
Normalized Ability Balance 0.15 0.12 0 0.97
General Ability 620.75 70.33 330 800
Normalized General Ability 0.63 0.14 0.04 1
GPA 3.11 0.46 1.84 4
Male 0.37 0.48 0 1
Grad Year 2003 2.02 1999 2006
Two Majors 0.24 0.43 0 1
Total Courses Taken 37.55 4.14 17 65
Transcript Index 2.32 0.35 1.21 4.89
Courses Required for Majors 17.40 7.39 8 54
Courses Placed Out 7.54 6.95 0 49
Upper Level Courses 6.37 4.58 0 30
Lower Level Courses 31.16 5.63 8 63
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Table 4.2: Summary Statistics for All Male Students (N=6,375)
Variable Mean Std Dev Min Max
Initial Residency Status 0.79 0.41 0 1
Year of Birth 1881 2.15 1975 1985
Age at Grad 22.44 0.71 19 25
White 0.83 0.37 0 1
Asian 0.06 0.23 0 1
Black 0.08 0.27 0 1
Other 0.03 0.18 0 1
Ability Balance 62.7 48.57 0 340
Normalized Ability Balance 0.17 0.13 0 0.89
General Ability 636.42 71.46 330 800
Normalized General Ability 0.67 0.15 0.04 1
GPA 3.06 0.49 1.84 4
Grad Year 2003 2.03 1999 2006
Two Majors 0.24 0.43 0 1
Total Courses Taken 37.58 4.06 19 61
Transcript Index 2.34 0.36 1.39 4.56
Courses Required for Majors 17.36 7.70 8 54
Courses Placed Out 8.56 7.53 0 49
Upper Level Courses 7.49 5.02 0 28
Lower Level Courses 30.08 5.77 10 61
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Table 4.3: Summary Statistics for All Female Students (N=10,724)
Variable Mean Std Dev Min Max
Initial Residency Status 0.82 0.38 0 1
Year of Birth 1981 2.09 1975 1985
Age at Grad 22.26 0.64 19 25
White 0.79 0.41 0 1
Asian 0.05 0.22 0 1
Black 0.13 0.33 0 1
Other 0.03 0.18 0 1
Ability Balance 56.21 44.29 0 370
Normalized Ability Balance 0.15 0.12 0 0.97
General Ability 611.43 67.96 350 800
Normalized General Ability 0.62 0.14 0.08 1
GPA 3.14 0.44 1.86 4
Grad Year 2003 2.02 1999 2006
Two Majors 0.24 0.43 0 1
Total Courses Taken 37.52 4.19 17 65
Transcript Index 2.32 0.34 1.21 4.89
Courses Required for Majors 17.42 7.20 8 46
Courses Placed Out 6.93 6.50 0 47
Upper Level Courses 5.70 4.16 0 30
Lower Level Courses 31.81 5.44 8 63
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Table 4.4: Summary Statistics for Survey Completers (N=4,540)
Variable Mean Std Dev Min Max
Initial Residency Status 0.84 0.37 0 1
Year of Birth 1983 0.91 1979 1985
Age at Grad 22.24 0.58 19 25
White 0.79 0.41 0 1
Asian 0.06 0.24 0 1
Black 0.10 0.30 0 1
Other 0.05 0.21 0 1
Ability Balance 56.71 44.87 0 370
Normalized Ability Balance 0.15 0.12 0 0.97
General Ability 634.90 65.58 410 800
Normalized General Ability 0.66 0.13 0.20 1
GPA 3.20 0.43 1.93 4
Male 0.36 0.48 0 1
Grad Year 2005 0.79 2002 2006
Two Majors 0.28 0.45 0 1
Total Courses Taken 36.45 4.27 19 56
Transcript Index 2.31 0.36 1.29 4.20
Courses Required for Majors 17.95 7.40 8 42
Courses Placed Out 9.36 7.60 0 47
Upper Level Courses 6.08 4.64 0 28
Lower Level Courses 30.35 5.65 11 56
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Table 4.5: Summary Statistics for Male Survey Completers (N=1,623)
Variable Mean Std Dev Min Max
Initial Residency Status 0.81 0.39 0 1
Year of Birth 1983 0.93 1979 1985
Age at Grad 22.32 0.60 19 25
White 0.83 0.38 0 1
Asian 0.07 0.25 0 1
Black 0.06 0.24 0 1
Other 0.05 0.21 0 1
Ability Balance 60.22 45.77 0 290
Normalized Ability Balance 0.16 0.12 0 0.76
General Ability 653.08 65.02 410 800
Normalized General Ability 0.70 0.13 0.20 1
GPA 3.18 0.44 1.97 4
Grad Year 2005 0.78 2002 2006
Two Majors 0.29 0.45 0 1
Total Courses Taken 36.30 4.29 19 51
Transcript Index 2.33 0.37 1.39 4.2
Courses Required for Majors 17.96 7.8 8 42
Courses Placed Out 10.75 8.16 0 42
Upper Level Courses 7.26 5.23 0 28
Lower Level Courses 29.03 5.86 11 46
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Table 4.6: Summary Statistics for Female Survey Completers (N=2,917)
Variable Mean Std Dev Min Max
Initial Residency Status 0.85 0.36 0 1
Year of Birth 1983 0.90 1980 1985
Age at Grad 22.19 0.56 19 25
White 0.77 0.42 0 1
Asian 0.06 0.23 0 1
Black 0.12 0.33 0 1
Other 0.05 0.22 0 1
Ability Balance 54.75 44.24 0 370
Normalized Ability Balance 0.14 0.12 0 0.97
General Ability 624.79 63.69 425 800
Normalized General Ability 0.64 0.13 0.23 1
GPA 3.21 0.44 1.93 4
Grad Year 2005 0.80 2002 2006
Two Majors 0.28 0.45 0 1
Total Courses Taken 36.53 4.26 19 56
Transcript Index 2.30 0.35 1.29 4.09
Courses Required for Majors 17.95 7.16 8 41
Courses Placed Out 8.59 7.15 0 47
Upper Level Courses 5.42 4.13 0 28
Lower Level Courses 31.09 5.39 11 56
43
Table 4.7: Comparisons of Means for the Two Samples
Sample All Survey5
N 17,099 4,540
Initial Residency Status 0.81 0.84*
Year of Birth 1981 1983*
Age at Grad 23.33 22.24*
White 0.81 0.79*
Black 0.11 0.10
Asian 0.05 0.06
Other 0.03 0.05*
Ability Balance 58.63 56.75*
Normalized Ability Balance 0.15 0.15*
General Ability 620.75 634.90*
Normalized General Ability 0.63 0.66*
GPA 3.11 3.20*
Male 0.37 0.36*
Grad Year 2003 2005*
Two Majors 0.24 0.28*
Total Courses Taken 37.55 36.44*
Transcript Index 2.33 2.31*
Courses Required for Majors 17.40 17.95*
Courses Placed Out 7.54 9.36*
Upper Level Courses 6.37 6.08*
Lower Level Courses 31.16 30.35*
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Table 4.8: Frequencies for Survey Completers
Variable Value Frequency Percent
Received Financial Aid Yes 2,857 62.80
No 1,689 37.20
Parental Income $30,000 or less 312 6.87
$30,001-$75,000 1,376 30.31
$75,001-$100,000 923 20.33
$100,001-150,000 961 21.17
more than $150,000 968 21.32
Father’s Education less than HS Graduate 55 1.21
HS Graduate 454 10.00
Some College 627 13.81
College Degree 1,626 35.81
Graduate Degree 1,778 39.16
Mother’s Education less than HS Graduate 44 0.97
HS Graduate 458 10.09
Some College 851 18.74
College Degree 1,914 42.16
Graduate Degree 1,273 28.04
Table 4.9: Correlations of Survey Responses (N=4,540)
Variable Financial Aid Income Father’s Educ. Mother’s Educ.
Financial Aid 1.00
Income -0.37* 1.00
Father’s Education -0.24* 0.42* 1.00
Mother’s Education -0.17* 0.32* 0.52* 1.00
* =
p-value < 0.0001.
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Table 4.10: Mean Normalized Ability Measures and Fraction with Two Majors by Year
Sample: All Survey
Graduation Year
1999 General Ability 0.54 .
Ability Balance 0.23 .
Two Majors 0.20 .
2000 General Ability 0.61 .
Ability Balance 0.16 .
Two Majors 0.18 .
2001 General Ability 0.61 .
Ability Balance 0.15 .
Two Majors 0.21 .
2002 General Ability 0.62 .
Ability Balance 0.15 .
Two Majors 0.23
2003 General Ability 0.64 0.71
Ability Balance 0.15 0.15
Two Majors 0.25 0.26
2004 General Ability 0.64 0.65
Ability Balance 0.15 0.15
Two Majors 0.25 0.26
2005 General Ability 0.65 0.66
Ability Balance 0.15 0.15
Two Majors 0.27 0.28
2006 General Ability 0.67 0.68
Ability Balance 0.15 0.15
Two Majors 0.28 0.29
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4.1.2 Majors and the Curriculum
Graduates from UNC-Chapel Hill are allowed to select at most two majors. All students
must fulfill a spectrum of General College distribution requirements in the College of Arts
and Sciences during their first two years of study. Thereafter, each student chooses either
to remain in the College of Arts and Sciences while completing his major requirements or to
apply to one of the various professional schools, such as Nursing or Business, to complete his
degree. Several additional Perspective requirements must generally be satisfied as upper-level
distributional electives outside the major department, in addition to the major coursework.
The type of major that each student attempts, as well as which schools (i.e., Arts and
Sciences, Business, Education, etc.) he attends for his major(s) determine the degree that
he receives. As should be expected, an individual with two majors that would each normally
result in a Bachelor of Arts degree receives a Bachelor of Arts degree. However, an individual
with at least one major that would normally lead to a Bachelor of Science degree receives a
Bachelor of Science degree, regardless of his second major choice. For example, an individual
majoring in Applied Sciences (which confers a B.S.) and English (which confers an A.B.) would
receive only a B.S. at graduation.
Approximately 24% of the individuals in the sample graduated with two majors. However,
as indicated in Tables 4.11 and 4.12, the fraction of individuals choosing two majors varies
widely both by degree type and by the school from which the individual received his degree.
Over 29% of those individuals receiving an A.B. chose two majors, while only 10% of those
with a B.S. did so.6 Moreover, most of the double majors are concentrated among individuals
who graduated from the College of Arts and Sciences, the School of Business, the School of
Education, and the School of Journalism and Mass Communication. These differences may be
explained in part by noting that the overlap of a student’s distribution requirements and his
free electives with his major choice differs widely across majors because of differences in the
number of requirements that must be satisfied for each.
6The fraction of students obtaining an A.B. has remained relatively stable, at around 72%, during the time
period considered. Therefore, it is unlikely that the fact that students with an A.B. are more likely to double
major has contributed to the recent increase in double majors.
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In general, A.B. majors in the College of Arts and Sciences require between 8 and 15
courses, which can, to varying degrees, be satisfied as part of the distribution requirements.
The A.B. degree requirements typically differ from the B.S. requirements for those majors, such
as Biology, that offer both tracks in that the A.B. track offers considerably more flexibility in
terms of the electives and preparatory course work involved. Degrees from the professional
schools of Business, Journalism, and Education also tend to offer considerable flexibility in
coursework external to the major.
In contrast, B.S. and B.F.A. majors in the College of Arts and Sciences typically require
upwards of twenty courses, though this is compensated for in some cases by a waiver of the
upper-level Perspective requirements in other departments. Some of the required courses can
be partly satisfied via the distribution requirements, but many of the electives are predeter-
mined, so the overall course load is higher both within and without the major field. In fact,
students earning a B.F.A. in art are prohibited by the Department of Art from electing a
second major. Degrees from the more science-based professional schools, such as Medicine and
Nursing, tend to have similarly demanding course loads.
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Table 4.11: Percent Double Majors by Degree Type
Degree Type No. Obs Percent with Two Majors
Bachelor of Arts 12,301 29.09
Bachelor of Fine Arts or Music 163 12.27
Bachelor of Science 4,635 10.40
Table 4.12: Percent Double Majors by Degree School
Degree School No. Obs Percent with Two Majors
Arts and Sciences 12,110 26.42
Business 1,582 13.08
Dentistry 60 0.00
Education 386 24.87
Information and Library Science 34 29.41
Journalism and Mass Communication 2,100 26.38
Medicine 124 1.61
Nursing 463 0.00
Public Health 240 5.42
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4.1.3 Employment Index
As indicated in the theory section of this paper, the similarity of the two majors that an
individual would like to acquire should, in part, determine whether he finds it cost-effective to
graduate with two majors instead of only one. Since this degree of similarity is observable for
those students who had two majors, I create a diversity index that measures skill similarity in
terms of the employment profile associated with each major.
Employment information is not available for the UNC graduates in the sample. Therefore,
I create the employment diversity index using data from the Baccalaureate and Beyond study
of the National Center for Education Statistics (NCES). This study documents the employ-
ment experiences of a nationally representative sample of college graduates who received their
bachelor’s degrees in the early 1990’s. In consequence, the NCES sample represents a cohort
of college graduates that entered the job market somewhat earlier than the graduates from
UNC. Since it is reasonable to think that UNC student perceptions about the job market
may have been colored by observing or hearing about the experiences of their predecessors
throughout the country, the results of this NCES study provide a rough means of capturing
these perceptions.
The raw data from this NCES study cannot be accessed without a special license. However,
one 2001 NCES publication contains information about the occupations in which individuals
in the study with specific majors ended up a few years after having graduated. I reproduce this
information below in Table 4.13, which presents the percentage of individuals with a bachelor’s
degree in each of 13 major groups who were employed in each of 12 occupational groups in
1997. For example, of those students who majored in mathematics or the physical sciences
(major group 11), 26.2% became educators, 16.5% went into business or management, 9%
became engineers or architects, 24% went into research or technical positions, and 8.4% went
into services. The full set of employment percentages for all 12 occupational groups may be
considered the employment profile associated with academic training in math or the physical
sciences.
In this context, the similarity of two majors can be characterized roughly as the similarity
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of the employment profiles associated with the major groups in which those two majors fall.
For example, if the employment profiles for business majors and social science majors are
very similar, then we may infer that these two areas of study have much in common. This
combination of majors would correspond to a low diversity choice.
I measure the similarity of two employment profiles as simply the sum of the absolute
differences in the fractions of graduates employed in each occupational category. More formally,
suppose that the employment profile associated with major group j, for j = 1, ..., 13, is the set
{pij}, for i = 1, ...12, where pij is the probability that an individual with a major in group j
is employed in occupation group i. Then, the similarity of major group j to major group k is
given by
δE(j, k) =
12∑
i=1
|pij − pik|
This index obviously provides a diversity value of 0 for any two majors in the same major
group, or for any major with itself. However, larger numbers correspond to greater diversity.
For example, the diversity index value associated with a double major in business and a social
science can be calculated as
δE(2, 12) = 60.2
In contrast, the diversity for a double major in business and nursing is
δE(2, 5) = 191.4
These numbers indicate that students of business and students of nursing have less similar em-
ployment profiles than do students of business and students of the social sciences. Therefore,
a student with a double major in business and nursing acquires skills that are less similar,
from the perspective of employment outcomes, than one with a double major in business and
a social science. For the set of major combinations realized in the data, this index takes on
34 distinct values. In addition, for ease of interpretation, I create a normalized version of this
index that falls between 0 and 1.7
7I also consider a second version of the diversity measure that represents the similarity of majors in terms of
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the overlap in the courses required for each major. However, the empirical results for that measure are similar
to those for the employment index and smaller in magnitude. Therefore, I omit those results.
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Table 4.15: Normalized Employment Index (Observed for Double Majors Only)
Sample No. Obs Mean Std Dev Min Max
All 4,082 0.33 0.26 0 1
Survey 1,273 0.32 0.26 0 1
All Men 1,539 0.30 0.25 0 0.94
Survey Men 463 0.32 0.26 0 0.94
All Women 2,543 0.34 0.26 0 1
Survey Women 810 0.33 0.25 0 1
Summary statistics for the normalized employment index, as well as its correlations with
the ability measures for those cases with two majors, are presented in the two tables below.
General ability and the ability balance measure have a small but statistically significant posi-
tive correlation, though breaking these correlations down by gender suggests that this pattern
holds only for women. Thus, more generally able women are also more likely to be less balanced
in this sample8, though this is not necessarily true for men. In addition, general ability has
a small negative correlation with the normalized employment index for women, while ability
balance is not correlated with this diversity measure. None of these measures are correlated
for men or for the survey respondents, although men do exhibit a 6% restriction of range in the
employment index relative to women. Thus, the most diversified women choose two majors
that are less similar than do the most diversified men. Moreover, the mean employment index
for women slightly exceeds that for men in both samples, indicating that women with two
majors are, on average, acquiring less similar skills than are men with two majors.
8Recall that the normalized ability balance measure is inversely related to actual ability balance.
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4.1.4 What It Means to Double Major
From a purely descriptive perspective, the students who chose two majors differ in several
respects from those who chose only one. With regard to demographics, double majors tend
to be slightly younger at graduation and are more likely to be White. However, among those
students who completed the family background survey, there are no significant differences with
respect to the receipt of financial aid or parental income and education.
With regard to academic choices and abilities, double majors tend to be of higher general
ability and to be more balanced in their specific abilities. They also graduate with a higher
GPA, place out of more courses upon matriculation, take more courses to graduate, and take
a higher level of courses on average. These students are also less likely to be North Carolina
residents during their first year of enrollment (i.e., they are out-of-state matriculants and
therefore faced higher admissions standards).
These observations suggest that the students who graduate with two majors not only begin
college better prepared on average but also commit themselves to a more challenging academic
program by selecting two majors rather than one. In addition, it is noteworthy that the
transcript index (which is the average number of courses taken in any given department) for
students with two majors is slightly higher on average than that for those with one major,
suggesting that double majors actually achieve a greater average degree of specialization by
choosing more than one field of study. Thus, from the perspective of acquiring a small number
of distinct, marketable skills (represented by majors) at the level of a college degree, the choice
of a second major represents a diversification decision. However, from the perspective of the
wide range of coursework taken at varying levels and in various departments during the course
of an undergraduate career, the selection of a second major is actually a decision to be more
specialized.
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Table 4.17: Two-sided Test of Means: One vs. Two Majors
All Variable One Major (N=13,017) Two Majors (N=4,082)
GPA* 3.07 3.23
General Ability* 615.28 638.18
Normalized General Ability* 0.62 0.70
Ability Balance* 59.10 57.15
Normalized Ability Balance* 0.16 0.15
Total Courses Taken* 37.38 38.10
Upper Level Courses* 6.19 6.95
Lower Level Courses 31.17 31.12
Courses Placed Out* 6.92 9.52
Courses Required for Majors* 16.13 21.42
Transcript Index* 2.28 2.47
Age at Graduation* 22.34 22.28
Survey Variable One Major (N=3,267) Two Majors (N=1,273)
GPA* 3.17 3.29
General Ability* 629.40 649.03
Normalized General Ability* 0.65 0.69
Ability Balance 57.11 55.66
Normalized Ability Balance 0.15 0.15
Total Courses Taken* 36.22 37.03
Upper Level Courses* 5.87 6.62
Lower Level Courses 30.34 30.39
Courses Placed Out* 8.62 11.25
Courses Required for Majors* 16.60 21.44
Transcript Index* 2.27 2.44
Age at Graduation 22.24 22.22
*=significant difference at the 5% level or below.
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Table 4.18: Two-sided Test of Proportions: One vs. Two Majors
All Variable One Major (N=13,017) Two Majors (4,082)
Resident* 0.82 0.77
Male 0.37 0.37
White* 0.80 0.81
Asian 0.05 0.05
Black* 0.11 0.09
Other* 0.03 0.04
Survey Variable One Major (N=3,267) Two Majors (N=1,273)
Resident* 0.85 0.79
Male 0.35 0.36
White 0.79 0.80
Asian 0.06 0.05
Black 0.10 0.09
Other 0.05 0.05
*=significant difference at the 5% level or below.
Table 4.19: Two-sided Test of Survey Proportions: One vs. Two Majors
Variable Value One Major Two Majors
Received Financial Aid Yes 0.63 0.62
Parental Income $30,000 or less 0.07 0.07
$30,001-$75,000 0.31 0.29
$75,001-$100,000 0.21 0.20
$100,001-150,000 0.21 0.22
more than $150,000 0.21 0.22
Father’s Education less than HS Graduate 0.01 0.01
HS Graduate 0.10 0.10
Some College 0.14 0.14
College Degree 0.36 0.34
Graduate Degree 0.38 0.41
Mother’s Education less than HS Graduate 0.01 0.01
HS Graduate 0.10 0.09
Some College 0.19 0.18
College Degree 0.42 0.42
Graduate Degree 0.28 0.29
Note: None statistically significant at conventional levels.
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4.2 Estimation Methods
In the empirical portion of this paper, I assess the qualitative relevance of the theory to the
case of UNC-Chapel Hill undergraduate degree recipients. In particular, I am interested in
the empirical signs and the significances of the effects of general ability, ability balance, and
perceived uncertainty, or cohort effects, on the skill investment patterns of these students as a
means of determining which students are most and least likely to choose two skills, and which
students are likely to be the most or least specialized in their skill choices.
In this context, all skills (i.e., majors) are acquired at the same level, and so the two
outcome variables of interest are the number of skills (one or two majors) and their degree of
similarity (diversity). Moreover, in this setup, skills are viewed as interesting and useful to
the individual only to the extent that they are marketable because an investment of a certain
magnitude has been made in those skills. Thus, even though course work taken outside of
specific major fields contributes to the overall course load required for graduation, this course
work is simply considered noise in the individual’s acquired skill set.
However, before proceeding to this analysis, it is instructive to consider the specializa-
tion/diversification decision from a more traditional viewpoint as a means of providing context.
Many economists have historically viewed this decision as a simple trade-off between depth
and breadth. In other words, devoting resources to obtain a greater depth of skill in any one
field necessarily reduces the resources that can be devoted to gaining expertise in the other
available fields.
In this traditional context, it is sufficient to consider as the outcome variable of interest
a single summary index that reflects the individual’s degree of specialization. For example,
Lazear (2005) uses transcript data for Stanford MBA graduates to examine the relationship be-
tween specialization in course work and the subsequent likelihood of becoming an entrepreneur.
For this purpose, he defines a specialization measure as the difference between the number of
courses taken in the selected MBA field of concentration and the average number of courses
taken in any of the other available concentrations. Individuals with higher values on this index
are relatively more specialized than their peers.
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Analogously, for the case of UNC undergraduates, we can consider the transcript index
discussed above. Recall that this index is the average number of courses taken in any given
academic department. Unlike Lazear’s specialization measure, the transcript index does not
evaluate specialization relative to the amount of course work done in a specific concentration.
However, this measure is better suited to the UNC undergraduate curriculum, both because
students can choose more than one major field and because majors themselves do not cor-
respond uniformly to academic departments. Some majors span several departments, while
others fall within only one. As a result, the transcript index summarizes the average degree
of student focus in any given department, regardless of how many majors that student has or
whether the major is interdisciplinary. Using this transcript index as the (continuous) depen-
dent variable, I carry out a simple ordinary least squares regression to assess the impact of the
ability measures and other student characteristics on academic specialization.
After carrying out this introductory analysis, I then turn to the question of what determines
skill number and diversity, implicitly holding level constant. To answer this question, I estimate
a system of equations, one equation for each of these outcome variables. The first of these
equations is an OLS regression of diversity on student characteristics. Diversity is a continuous
variable and is measured as the normalized employment index. However, diversity is only
observed for those students who have two majors. Therefore, the second equation is a selection
equation for which the dependent variable is nominally an indicator of whether the student
had a double major. As is common for the analysis of dichotomous dependent variables, I
assume that there exists an underlying latent continuous variable that determines the number
of majors and that the indicator variable takes on a value of 1 only when this latent variable
exceeds a certain threshold.
More formally, it is possible to elaborate this framework as a case of the Heckman selection
model. Omitting observation-level subscripts, let δ denote diversity, αi denote the coefficient
for regressor xi, and  denote a random error term. Then the outcome equation is given by
δ = α0 + α1x1 + α2x2 + ...+ αnxn + 
61
Moreover, δ is observed if and only if the individual graduates with two majors. Let n be
defined as the indicator of a double major:
n =
 1 if n
∗ > 0
0 otherwise
where n∗ is the latent variable that represents an individual’s propensity to acquire more skills
at the undergraduate level. Then, the selection equation is given by
n∗ = β0 + β1z1 + β2z2 + ...+ βmzm + φ
where βj is the coefficient for regressor zj and φ is a random error term.
As with the OLS regression for the transcript index, the regressors for the outcome equation
and the selection equation comprise student-level demographics and academic characteristics.
In the absence of a suitable exclusion restriction, I assume that the model is identified solely
based on functional form. I estimate this system of equations via maximum likelihood.
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Chapter 5
Empirical Results
5.1 Determinants of the Transcript Index
The estimation results for the transcript index indicate that general ability is an important
predictor of course-level undergraduate specialization for both men and women at UNC, but
that ability balance influences specialization only for women. Moreover, the results suggest
that general ability is relatively more important for men than for women and that ability
balance plays a larger role for women than does general ability.
The two tables below present ordinary least squares regression specifications predicting the
transcript index. Men and women appear to have consistently different skill investment pat-
terns, so I break each specification down by gender. For the full sample, the graduation years
1999 and 2000 are grouped together as the omitted category to avoid collinearity. Similarly,
for the survey sample, the combination of years 2002-2004 is omitted. Birth year also tends to
be highly collinear with year of graduation, so I present results that control only for the latter
of these two variables. Year of graduation is of greater theoretical interest because it may be
interpreted as a rough measure of perceived labor market conditions. Finally, I consider only
two of the survey variables, namely receipt of financial aid and parental income, as the latter
tends to be most highly correlated with parental educational attainment.
The first table below (Table 5.1) presents the results for the sample of all students and a
comparable specification for the set of students who responded to the survey. The second table
(Table 5.2) considers only the survey respondents and incorporates the two survey variables
of interest.
For the full sample, the marginal effect of general ability for men ranges between -.98
courses and 1.02 courses (as general ability varies between 0 and 1), while that for women
ranges between -.32 courses and 0.28 courses. These marginal effects are zero when general
ability is equal to 0.49 for men and 0.53 for women. As a result, marginal increases in general
ability result in increasing marginal specialization above the midpoint of the ability distribution
but in decreasing marginal diversification below that midpoint. Therefore, the most and least
generally able individuals are the most specialized in terms of the average number of courses
taken in any given department, while those in the middle of the general ability distribution
take the most varied course load.
For the set of survey completers, the overall specialization pattern is similar, though these
effects are moderated by both the restriction of general ability range that we observe for survey
completers and by the additional variables that are available from the survey. In Table 5.1, the
marginal effect of general ability for men in the survey sample is somewhat smaller and ranges
between 0 and 1.72 courses. Thus, all the men in the survey sample are increasingly specialized
as their general ability increases. In contrast, the pattern for women is more comparable to,
though greater in magnitude than, that for the case of all female students. In this case, the
effect of a marginal increase in general ability for female survey respondents ranges between
-0.76 courses and 0.42 courses, and is equal to zero when general ability is 0.64. When the
survey variables are added to the analysis, as presented in Table 5.2, the effect of general ability
persists for men but becomes marginally significant or insignificant for women. In particular,
controlling for parental income eliminates the effect of general ability on the transcript index
for women.
The effect of ability balance on specialization is insignificant for males in all five specifica-
tions. However, the effect of ability balance for females is highly significant and is robust to the
inclusion of survey variables in the analysis. Specifically, for the set of all female students, the
effect of a marginal decrease in ability balance ranges between -0.16 courses and 0.60 courses,
and is equal to zero when the ability balance measure is equal to 0.21. Therefore, for women
in the upper quintile of the ability balance distribution (i.e., the most balanced individuals,
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for whom the balance measure is less than 0.21), a marginal decrease in ability balance leads
to decreasing marginal diversification. For women in the lower four quintiles of the ability bal-
ance distribution, the reverse is true: a marginal decrease in ability balance leads to increasing
marginal specialization. In short, it follows that the most and least balanced women are the
most specialized with regard to the average number of courses taken in any given department,
while those at the cusp of the highest quintile take the most varied course load. The pattern is
similar when the survey sample and the survey variables are considered, though the marginal
effect of a decrease in balance varies between -0.29 courses and 0.95 courses, with a value of
zero courses when ability balance is approximately 0.23.
As the financial costs of attendance are also of interest as a determinant of skill investment
patterns, it is noteworthy that financial aid is a significant predictor of specialization only for
women. The effect is small relative to those of the ability measures, however: receipt of financial
aid increases specialiation by 0.04 courses for women. Parental income does not appear to be
an important predictor of specialization for survey respondents, with the exception of males
in the highest income bracket, who tend to be less specialized by 0.09 courses relative to their
peers in the lowest income bracket.
The year of graduation is also a more important predictor of specialization for women than
for men, as women who graduated during the period 2002-2004 were slightly more specialized
than those who graduated in 1999 or 2000, though there is no significant difference in the
two time periods for men. In addition, both men and women who graduated in 2006 were
considerably less specialized than earlier graduates, usually by at least one-tenth of a course.
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5.2 Employment Index and the Number of Majors
The estimation results for the employment index (skill diversity) and the number of majors
suggest that more generally able men and women are both considerably more likely to double
major. However, general ability contributes to less similar majors for men and more similar
majors for women. Ability balance is not an important determinant of either major diversity
or the number of majors in these samples.
The five tables below present estimation results for the normalized employment index and
the number of majors, broken down by gender. In predicting these dependent variables, I
correct for selection in the diversity equation only when evidence of selection is present. In
particular, I employ the Heckman selection model for the group of all male students but use
the more simple combination of OLS and probit regressions for the set of all female students
and the set of survey completers, as no selection problem is evident in these cases (i.e., ρ is
not statistically significant). The first table presents results for all students, and the subse-
quent four tables consider a comparable specification for the survey completers, followed by
specifications incorporating the survey variables.
For the full sample, a marginal increase in general ability increases the normalized employ-
ment index by 0.36 points for men but decreases it by 0.13 points for women. These results
suggest that more generally able men prefer majors that are less similar, while the reverse is
true for more generally able women. For the survey sample, general ability does not signifi-
cantly influence major similarity for either gender. In contrast, a marginal increase in general
ability increases the likelihood of a double major for both men and women by .43-.51 points
at the mean, and this effect is highly significant for both genders, regardless of the sample
or covariates considered. Therefore, more generally able individuals of both genders are more
likely to double major, but the preferred similarity of those majors may be greater or lower,
depending on gender.
For men, ability balance is not a significant predictor of either major diversity or the number
of majors, regardless of which sample (all students or survey respondents) is considered. For
women, a marginal increase in ability balance increases the likelihood of a double major by
68
0.06 points at the mean, but this effect is only marginally significant for the set of all female
students and becomes insignificant for survey completers. The effect of ability balance on
major diversity is consistently insignificant. Thus, ability balance may influence the likelihood
of two majors for some students, but its overall impact is considerably smaller in this regard
than that of general ability.
With regard to financial impacts, neither of the survey variables is important in predicting
either major similarity or the number of majors. The effect of financial aid is consistently
insignificant, and the effects of parental income do not present a clear pattern, though it
appears that women in the middle and highest parental income brackets may be slightly less
likely to double major.
As demonstrated by the graduation-year coefficients, the likelihood of a double major has
increased consistently over time. Moreover, the diversity of majors has increased for men over
time and may have decreased slightly for women, at least for the full sample. The effect of
graduation year is muted or reversed for survey respondents, possibly because these students
all graduated in close succession.
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5.3 Synthesis of the Empirical Results
When considered simultaneously, the results for the transcript index and for the number and
diversity of majors provide an integrated picture of undergraduate skill investment patterns
at UNC. In particular, recalling that the decision to double major is actually a decision to
be more, rather than less, specialized in the context of the full undergraduate investment, we
arrive at the following overall pattern:
• The least generally able individuals tend to acquire one major, and their overall under-
graduate investment tends to be relatively narrow.
• As general ability increases, individuals still tend to choose a single major, but they may
branch out and take a more diverse range of electives, so that their overall investment is
more broad.
• As general ability increases past the midpoint of the distribution, individuals are likely
to consider a double major but their overall skill investment pattern is still relatively
broad.
• At the top of the general ability distribution, individuals are most likely to make a highly
focused investment in two majors. Thus, these individuals are highly specialized despite
the fact that they have more than one major. Men choose majors that are less similar
as their general ability increases, while the reverse is true for women.
• For ability balance, the picture is similar, except that it is only relevant for females in
this sample. The most and least balanced women will tend to be the most specialized,
though more balanced individuals may be slightly more likely to choose two majors.
Overall, it appears that there is a critical mass of general ability and/or ability balance that
make a broad skill investment possible. Below the threshold, individuals tend to specialize as
much as possible and invest in only one major; this may be the limit of what they can achieve.
Once that threshold is exceeded, however, individuals first have an incentive to broaden their
skill sets, possibly to compensate to some degree for innate imbalances or a lack of innate
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general ability. Finally, individuals of greatest ability in each dimension may have a smaller
incentive to invest broadly because they have greater ability already, and so these individuals
may find it most efficient to make a more focused investment in two specific areas that give
them distinct employment options.
In particular, the gender difference in the effect of general ability in major similarity pat-
terns for men and women may be partly explained by the fact that both general ability and
ability balance influence the overall breadth of the undergraduate skill investment for women
but not for men. In this sample, men have a slightly higher transcript index on average than
women, indicating that they are slightly more specialized overall. In addition, the women with
the least similar set of two majors achieves a degree of major diversity that exceeds that of
the men with the greatest major diversity, and the employment index for women is on aver-
age slightly higher than that for men. In other words, women appear to make a slightly less
specialized investment in general than do men. Thus, while the effect of general ability on
the likelihood of a second major is similar across genders, women end up with a more diverse
overall investment by virtue of the effect of ability balance. For this reason, it makes sense that
highly generally able men would use any additional general ability to decrease the similarity
of their majors, while comparable women would choose to become more focused as a counter
to their already greater breadth.
Also with regard to gender differences in skill investment, it is interesting to note that
ability balance appears to act as a constraint during the skill investment process for women
but not for men, as only for women is ability balance a significant predictor of the transcript
index. This difference is consistent with the idea that women may be anticipating different
labor market outcomes. Women in many professions continue to earn less than men with the
same credentials in the same jobs, and women are also more likely to take time out of the
labor force or work part-time for family reasons. Thus, the overall return to any given skill
may be lower for women, and they also may expect their skills to depreciate. For this reason,
women may have an incentive to invest in greater skill breadth, to acquire a wider variety of
skills. In this way, they may guarantee themselves a job if they want one and are not too picky
about what type of work they do or how much they get paid. And, alternatively, one may ask
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whether different investment patterns contribute to lower wages for women relative to men, or
whether there is some type of mutually reinforcing feedback at work in this regard.
In addition to these effects of ability on the skill investment patterns, the empirical results
also suggest that perceived economic uncertainty, or cohort effects, have played an important
role in the evolution of skill investment over time. Although the average transcript index
does not appear to have changed a great deal over time for most of the years considered, a
substantial (.08-.15 courses) and highly significant decrease in this index occurred for both
men and women who graduated in 2006; this effect is present in both samples, though it is
largest for the survey respondents. While it is not possible to say with certainty what may
have caused this large shift in departmental diversification, it is interesting to note that the
students who graduated in 2006 would have mostly matriculated in the fall of 2002, just one
year after the September 11th, 2001, terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center in New York.
It is reasonable to suppose that the economic conditions that were present at that time should
have influenced the skill investment decisions of these entering students, while students who
were already enrolled at the time of the attacks might have already committed themselves to
certain programs of study, given that many general distribution requirements are completed
during the first year of college.
Cohort effects also appear to be important for the likelihood of a double major, as the
fraction of students graduating with two majors has increased steadily as a result of the
elapse of time, even when increases in general ability across admitted cohorts are taken into
consideration. This result is consistent with the idea that increasing perceptions of labor
market risk have lead more and more students to diversify their skills in a way that would lead
to more employment options.
Finally, we can infer that, at least for the selected group of students who completed the
survey, financial measures are not particularly important determinants of skill investment
patterns. Abilities play a far larger role in this context.1
1One can imagine, however, that financial matters might contribute to choice of university. If that is the
case, and if the skill investment pattern of a given individual would vary across institutions, then we could
imagine a substantial role for financial considerations in general, even if we do not observe such a role within
the context of a particular school.
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5.4 Reconciling Theory and Practice for UNC
Recall that the theoretical part of this paper suggests that more generally able and more
balanced individuals will be more likely to graduate with a larger number of skills in the
context of considerable perceived uncertainty only if cost complementarities are present in the
skill investment process. In particular, the intuition underlying the choice of two skills over
one skill has to do with the fact that more generally able individuals find it optimal to acquire
a higher level of skill than those who are less generally able. For this reason, more generally
able individuals should be more likely to prefer one skill to none but less likely to prefer two to
one, given that these individuals make a greater investment per skill. However, under sufficient
perceived uncertainty and a decreasing cost per skill, more generally able individuals acquire
more skills because they face the greatest marginal surplus from doing so.
Clearly, UNC students who are more generally able are empirically more likely to double
major (i.e., to prefer two skills to one), regardless of gender. Thus, a literal application
of the theory to this population implies that significant cost complementarities are present.
This conclusion is reasonable, given that previous research has also found evidence of such
complementarities. Moreover, it appears that general ability plays an extremely important
role in determining whether a student chooses to double major, especially when considered
beside the effects of other demographic and environmental factors. This observation by itself
suggests that a double major is likely to be not only a means toward employment diversification
for some students but also an effective market signal of general ability.
However, in interpreting the UNC results, it is instructive also to recognize that the acqui-
sition of a major in any given department is, in essence, the most focused skill investment that
undergraduates can make while in college. Students do invest in other skills while in school,
they just do so at varying degrees of focus, as suggested by the transcript index. Thus, we can
also consider the relevance of the intuition underlying the theoretical model by extending the
concept of skill-as-major to that of skill-as-department.
In particular, the effects of general ability and ability balance on the breadth of skill
investment, as measured by the transcript index, indicate that the most generally able of both
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genders and the most balanced women are likely to be among the most specialized. General
ability contributes to investment in more skills, but only for those toward the middle of the
general ability distribution. Similarly, more ability balance contributes to investment in more
skills for most women but has the reverse effect for those who are already extremely balanced.
Thus, we can draw at least two conclusions from the empirical analysis in conjunction
with the theory. First, complementarities are most likely present in the learning process.
Second, however, it is also the case that breadth of investment, or the overall number of skills
acquired, does not necessarily increase with ability. Ability balance contributes to breadth
of investment for women, but the most balanced actually become more specialized as their
balance increases. This result is consistent with the idea that these most balanced women
either find it more costly or have less incentive to invest in a wider range of skills. In addiiton,
the most generally able individuals of both genders face a greater return to any particular skill
and therefore make a more focused, or more in-depth, investment. These individuals have less
need of skill diversification and therefore invest in fewer skills overall.2
2One important limitation of this analysis is that we do not observe the ability profile of those individuals
who did not acquire at least one skill, or who dropped out of school. Thus the observed ability distributions
are not necessarily the full ability spectrum for UNC students, and it may be that the most or least balanced
or generally able in this sample actually fall closer to the middle of these distributions.
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Chapter 6
Conclusions
I began this investigation with the questions of why the fraction of students with two
majors has been increasing over time, and of how the interaction of abilities and perceptions
of labor market uncertainty may have contributed to this trend. The results of the theoretical
and empirical analyses presented here suggest that this trend can be explained (at least in
part) as resulting from both an increase in mean SAT scores over time and the response of the
most generally able students to increases in their perceived future wage uncertainty.
From a theoretical perspective, increases in perceived uncertainty increase the set of indi-
viduals who prefer two skills to one, and those who are most generally able will find it most
cost-effective to acquire two skills (rather than opt out of the skilled labor market) in this
context. From an empirical perspective, students of higher general ability of both genders are
much more likely to graduate with two majors, and the mean ability of graduates from UNC
has been increasing steadily from year to year. Moreover, perceived uncertainty, as measured
by cohort effects, appears to have been increasing over time as well. Thus, an increasing frac-
tion of students is of the type that is likely to choose two majors, and this type has been given
an increasing incentive to do so.
The policy implications of this research become clear when considered in conjunction with
recommendations that other researchers have already made concerning double majors and
education policy. In particular, Del Rossi and Hersch (2008) present empirical evidence that
students who choose two disparate majors (typically one quantitative and one not) will tend
to have higher returns than those students who choose a single major in a non-quantitative
field, though these returns are not necessarily any greater than for a single quantitative major.
Students who combine a business major with a quantitative major receive additional returns
over and above that from a single major in either field, but business majors appear to be
special in this regard. The authors also find that those students with double majors tend to be
more likely to complete graduate school, more likely to undergo subsequent on-the-job training,
and more likely to be in occupations that require a broader range and higher level of specific
skills, such as originality, negotiation, and social perceptiveness. Because of the temporal
relationships of the variables in their analysis, they are not able to determine whether more
able individuals select majors with higher returns or whether certain majors provide both
higher returns and greater skills. Regardless, the authors conclude that, because the return to
any double-major combination is not identical across double-majors, the observed skills most
likely come from the majors themselves rather than from underlying, pre-existing ability. In
consequence, these authors recommend that more college students be encouraged to attempt
a second major.
However, in considering the results of their paper in conjunction with those of my own, I
believe that their conclusions and policy suggestions may be counterproductive. In the first
place, there is no reason why a signaling motive for double majoring should result in an equal-
ization of returns across all double-major combinations. Rather, since there are differential
returns to single majors, we should expect there to be differential returns to double majors,
because students of different abilities prefer and select into different majors1, and these choices
are themselves signals as a result. Second, if the empirical results from my analysis of UNC
undergraduates are consistent with the investment patterns of students at other universities,
then it is clear that investment patterns depend in large part on initial ability conditions,
which is probably in part why test scores continue to play such an important role in college
admissions. Students may acquire new skills while in college, and these learned skills may pro-
vide some return in the labor market in and of themselves, but the choices of major and the
number of majors are strong indicators of underlying ability differences. Thus, initial ability
1For example, see Arcidiacono (2004).
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differences persist through the college experience and into the labor market and translate into
wage differentials.
This conclusion is, in itself, not new. But this conclusion is normally drawn in the context
of education level, such as whether or not a student acquires a graduate degree: more able
students go farther in school and earn more as a result. However, it is no accident that double
majors are more likely to obtain a graduate degree or to engage in on-the-job training after
graduation. These choices are all just different ways in which individuals demonstrate their
underlying intellectual fitness.
Because the choice of a double major does appear to be such a strong signal of ability at
matriculation, recommending that more students double major is likely to have adverse effects
on those students who are not already doing so. To the extent that ability is a constraint,
more individuals will be able to double major only if (1) the requirements for those majors
are reduced or (2) less able students spend more time and money to complete their degrees2.
Either situation would have the effect of increasing the cost and reducing the value of the double
major, much the way that the overall increase in volume and heterogeneity of college graduates
over the past several decades has eroded the signaling value of the bachelor’s degree and pushed
up the cost of college tuition. Moreover, those students who would benefit least from such an
investment would be spending the most on it. And those students who are currently double
majoring as a way of diversifying their employment options and trying to make themselves
stand out in the increasingly competitive labor pool would simply find yet some other way to
differentiate themselves and maintain their employment edge. Recommending that less able
students double major is essentially encouraging them to chase a moving target that they are
unlikely ever to hit.
Therefore, I recommend an alternative policy: we should recognize that students with low
or very unbalanced test scores begin their college studies at a disadvantage. To the extent that
math and verbal skills can be taught, these skills should be emphasized and mastered before
college entry. In some cases, deferral of college entry may be advisable. Students who manage
2Currently, double majors do not take longer to complete their educations than single majors. See Del Rossi
and Hersch (2008).
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to enter a university with poor scores should be encouraged to select one single major that
they are comfortable with and to use their electives to focus on improving the fundamental
skills that they lack and should have learned in high school. Doing so will put them in a better
position to attempt one of the more lucrative majors or to enter a graduate program or to take
advantage of on-the-job training opportunities. Improving these fundamentals at an earlier
age will give more students the skills that they need to self-insure against employment risk in
an increasingly competitive and risky labor market.
Because relatively few researchers have considered the causes and implications of diverse
specialization for highly skilled workers, several promising avenues exist for future related
research. First, the theoretical part of this paper has made the assumption that workers who
acquire more skills at a given level are more likely to be employed, for reasons of labor demand
diversification. However, this assumption has not been tested. Abstracting from ability signals,
it may be that double majors are perceived by employers as less focused than their peers who
select one major. Therefore, it is not clear a priori that choosing two majors necessarily
improves employment prospects if all credentials are revealed to potential employers.
Second, the empirical analysis in this paper has considered only bachelor’s degree recipients
at one university. It would be interesting to investigate whether these same patterns hold
at other schools and at other degree levels, such as joint professional degree programs. In
particular, considering a broader range of individuals across multiple levels of schooling might
provide richer variation in ability data that would allow better observation of the effects of
ability balance on skill investment patterns.
Third, the differential impact of ability balance on the transcript index for men and women
suggests that women may have systematically different skill investment patterns than men. In
particular, because the women in this sample do make a slightly less specialized investment
overall than men, it would be interesting to investigate whether these differences could in
part explain any remaining wage differentials between genders that cannot be explained by
the attributes that hiring managers commonly observe during an interview. For example,
Mulligan and Rubinstein (2008) find evidence that recent declines in the gender wage gap are
consistent with the idea that more able women in the 1990’s selected into the labor force, while
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those of lower ability selected out of it. This selection rule is a reversal of what was observed
in the 1970’s, as previously the most able women would not have chosen to work. However,
the analysis presented here suggests that there may also be educational investment differences
across gender that are not readily observed by the casual researcher. Men and women who
supposedly have the same job and the same credentials and the same measured intellectual
ability may not really have all the same acquired skills, and it is not clear whether women make
different skill investments because they anticipate different outcomes or whether the different
outcomes derive in part from this subtle difference in skill investment patterns.
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Appendix A
Analytic Results and Proofs
Result 1:
The individual optimally acquiring one skill selects skill
θ∗11 = 0
at level
λ∗11 = g
(
1 +
1
2σ
)
.
In addition,
∂λ∗11
∂g
> 0,
∂λ∗11
∂σ
< 0,
∂λ∗11
∂v
= 0,
∂2λ∗11
∂σ∂g
< 0.
Proof of Result 1:
An individual acquiring one skill solves
max
λ11, θ11
{S1 = B1 − C11}.
The first-order conditions (FOC) in this case are given by
λ11 :
g
σ
− 2(λ∗11 − g) = 0
and
θ11 : −2v sin(θ∗11) = 0.
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Solving these yields
λ∗11 = g
(
1 +
1
2σ
)
and
θ∗11 = 0, pi.
Similarly, the second-order conditions (SOC) are
λ11 : −2 < 0
and
θ11 : −2v cos(θ∗11),
which is negative in the domain of θ only for θ∗11 = 0. Differentiation of λ∗11 yields
∂λ∗11
∂g
=
(
1 +
1
2σ
)
> 0,
∂λ∗11
∂σ
=
−g
2σ2
< 0,
and
∂2λ∗11
∂σ∂g
=
−1
2σ2
< 0.
Result 2 :
The individual optimally acquiring two skills selects diversity
δ∗ =

pi, v ≤ 12pi
2 arcsin
(
1
2piv
)
, v > 12pi
at skill levels
λ∗21 = λ
∗
22 = g
(
1 +
1
4σ
)
.
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Furthermore, for j = 1, 2,
∂λ∗2j
∂g
> 0,
∂λ∗2j
∂σ
< 0,
∂λ∗2j
∂v
= 0,
∂2λ∗2j
∂σ∂g
< 0,
∂δ∗
∂g
= 0,
∂δ∗
∂σ
= 0,
and, for v > 12pi ,
∂δ∗
∂v
< 0.
Proof of Result 2 :
An individual acquiring two skills solves
max
λ21, λ22, θ21, θ22
{S2 = B2 − C21 − C22}.
When the individual acquires two skills, the distance δ between the two skills may be defined
as δ = θ21− θ22, where θ21 ∈ [0, pi] and θ22 ∈ [−pi, 0]. The two skills optimally chosen are never
of the same sign, as otherwise the individual could acquire the skill negatively symmetric to
one of his choices and be strictly better off, without incurring any additional cost. The FOC
for the case in which two skills are acquired are given by
λ21 :
g
2σ
− 2(λ∗21 − g) = 0,
λ22 :
g
2σ
− 2(λ∗22 − g) = 0,
θ21 :
1
pi
− 2v sin(θ∗21) = 0,
and
θ22 :
−1
pi
− 2v sin(θ∗22) = 0.
A solution of these conditions yields
λ∗21 = λ
∗
22 = g
(
1 +
1
4σ
)
,
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θ∗21 =

pi
2 , v ≤ 12pi
arcsin
(
1
2piv
)
, v > 12pi
,
and
θ∗22 =

−pi2 , v ≤ 12pi
− arcsin ( 12piv) , v > 12pi .
These imply that
δ∗ =

pi, v ≤ 12pi
2 arcsin
(
1
2piv
)
, v > 12pi
.
Similarly, for j = 1, 2, the SOC in this case are given by
λ2j : −2 < 0
and
θ2j : −2v cos(θ∗2j) ≤ 0 ∀ θ∗2j ∈
[−pi
2
,
pi
2
]
.
Differentiation of the optimal skill levels and diversity yield
∂λ∗21
∂g
=
∂λ∗22
∂g
= 1 +
1
4σ
> 0,
∂λ∗21
∂σ
=
∂λ∗22
∂σ
=
−g
4σ2
< 0,
∂2λ∗21
∂σ∂g
=
∂2λ∗22
∂σ∂g
=
−1
4σ2
< 0,
and
∂δ∗
∂v
=
−1
piv2
√
1− ( 12piv)2 < 0, v >
1
2pi
.
The remaining derivatives in the result involve differentiation of a constant and are thus equal
to zero.
Result 3 :
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Let vˆ01, where 0 ≤ vˆ01 ≤ 1, denote the unique value of v at which individuals are just indifferent
between acquiring one skill and acquiring none. Individuals characterized by v > vˆ01 prefer
one skill to none. Moreover,
∂vˆ01
∂g
< 0,
∂vˆ01
∂σ
> 0,
∂2vˆ01
∂σ∂g
> 0.
In particular,
σ →∞ ⇒ vˆ01 → 1
0← σ ⇒ 0← vˆ01.
Proof of Result 3 :
One skill is preferable to none if the surplus from optimally acquiring one skill is positive, or if
S∗1 > 0,
which reduces to
v2 − 2v + 1− g2
(
1
σ
+
1
4σ2
)
< 0.
Solution of this inequality yields 1  0 for v such that
1− g
√
1
σ
+
1
4σ2
< v < 1 + g
√
1
σ
+
1
4σ2
.
The indicated upper bound for v always lies outside of the relevant domain, while the lower
bound may or may not, depending on the magnitudes of g and σ. Therefore, 1  0 for v such
that
1− g
√
1
σ
+
1
4σ2
< v ≤ 1.
Define
vˆ01 =

1− g
√
1
σ +
1
4σ2
, g
√
1
σ +
1
4σ2
< 1
0, g
√
1
σ +
1
4σ2
≥ 1
.
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For values of g and σ that do not imply a corner solution for vˆ01, implicit differentiation of
S∗1 = 0 yields
∂vˆ01
∂g
=
g
v − 1
(
1
σ
+
1
4σ2
)
< 0,
∂vˆ01
∂σ
=
−g2
2(v − 1)
(
1
σ2
+
1
2σ3
)
> 0,
and
∂2vˆ01
∂σ∂g
=
−g
v − 1
(
1
σ2
+
1
2σ3
)
> 0.
Moreover, the limiting behavior of vˆ01 may be inferred from its evaluation at various values of σ.
Result 4 :
Let vˆ12 and vˆ21, where 12pi ≤ vˆ12 ≤ vˆ21 ≤ 1, denote the two values of v at which individuals
are just indifferent between acquiring two skills and acquiring one. Individuals characterized
by v ≤ 12pi never prefer two skills to one. However, individuals characterized by v > 12pi prefer
two skills to one if vˆ12 < v < vˆ21. Moreover,
∂vˆ12
∂g
> 0,
∂vˆ12
∂σ
< 0,
∂2vˆ12
∂σ∂g
< 0
and
∂vˆ21
∂g
< 0,
∂vˆ21
∂σ
> 0,
∂2vˆ21
∂σ∂g
> 0.
In particular,
σ →∞ ⇒ 0.7373← vˆ12, vˆ21 → 1
0← σ ⇒ vˆ12 → 0.9731← vˆ21.
Proof of Result 4 :
An individual prefers two skills to one if the surplus from optimally acquiring two exceeds that
from optimally acquiring one, or if
S∗2 > S
∗
1 .
In the case that v ≤ 12pi , which corresponds to the set of individuals who find maximum
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diversity optimal if they acquire two skills, the above expression simplifies to
v2 + 2v +
g2
8σ2
< 0,
which is a contradiction. In this case, the marginal surpluses from both level and diversity
are strictly negative, indicating that the marginal skill is clearly not desirable. Therefore, one
skill is always preferred to two for individuals characterized by v ≤ 12pi . Conversely, if v > 12pi ,
which corresponds to the set of individuals who do not find maximum diversity optimal if they
acquire two skills, the relation S∗2 > S∗1 simplifies to
v2 + 2v + 1 +
g2
8σ2
− 2 arcsin
(
1
2piv
)
pi
− 4v
√
1−
(
1
2piv
)2
< 0,
which is no longer clearly a contradiction. The marginal surplus from level remains negative,
but that from diversity is no longer necessarily so. A closed-form solution of this inequality is
not readily available. However, the general behavior of candidate cutoffs may nonetheless be
determined.
For notational convenience, let F12 denote the function on the left side of this inequality. The
derivative of F12 with respect to v,
∂F12
∂v
= 2v + 2− 4
√
1−
(
1
2piv
)2
,
indicates that F12 is non-monotonic in v. In particular, if v12a and v12b respectively denote
the smaller and larger positive roots of ∂F12∂v on the relevant interval, then
∂F12
∂v

> 0, v ∈ ( 12pi , v12a)⋃(v12b, 1) ≈ (.1592, .1988)⋃(0.9731, 1),
< 0, v ∈ (v12a, v12b) ≈ (0.1988, 0.9731).
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This behavior may be verified via examination of the second-order derivative of F12 with
respect to v at each of these two critical points, or from inspection of a graph of the function.
Analytic solutions for v12a and v12b are extraordinarily long and messy and unlikely to provide
the reader with much insight. However, Mathematica yields numerical approximations of
(v12a, v12b) ≈ (0.198835 + 3.58492 ∗ 10−17i, 0.973067− 3.58492 ∗ 10−17i).
The imaginary component of these numbers is extremely small and likely results from approx-
imation error. Moreover, the real components of these roots correspond to the magnitudes
that would be expected from the examination of a graph of this derivative. Thus, the best real
approximation of these two roots is
(v12a, v12b) ≈ (0.1988, 0.9731).
The above multiplicity of roots initially implies the existence of three potential preference
cutoffs in the domain of v ∈ ( 12pi , 1) . However, one of these possibilities, namely a value of
v ∈ ( 12pi , v12a) may be eliminated through an examination of the limiting behavior of the func-
tion F12. First, note that, as σ →∞, the function F12 converges to
L12 ≡ v2 + 2v + 1−
2 arcsin
(
1
2piv
)
pi
− 4v
√
1−
(
1
2piv
)2
.
That is, the term in F12 containing g and σ effectively disappears, leaving an expression that
depends only on the value of v. Evaluation of this limiting function at the value v = 12pi yields
L12
(
1
2pi
) ≈ 0.3436, which is positive. Second, recall that F12 is increasing for v ∈ ( 12pi , v12a) .
Finally, note that, for any given value of g, decreases in σ shift the function F12 vertically
upward relative to L12. These three observations imply that a root of F12 falling in the in-
terval
(
1
2pi , v12a
)
does not exist for any value of σ. In other words, F12 is strictly positive for
all v ∈ ( 12pi , v12a) . In consequence, two candidates remain as roots of the function F12 for
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v ∈ ( 12pi , 1) , one or both of which is of interest, depending on the values of g and σ. Consider
again the limiting function L12 of F12 under extremely high levels of uncertainty. Evaluated
at v = 1, the value of this function is L12(1) ≈ −0.0508, which is negative. As F12, and thus
L12, are increasing for v ∈ (v12b, 1), no roots of F12 exist in this interval for the highest levels
of σ. In this case, only one preference cutoff is relevant, namely that in the interval (v12a, v12b),
and for v < 1 beyond this cutoff two skills are preferred to one. An estimate of this cutoff
is roughly v ≈ 0.7373. However, as uncertainty decreases from its upper limit, it is clear that
a second root becomes relevant, as it has already been noted that decreases in uncertainty
shift F12 vertically. Therefore, for some range of σ, F12 will have two roots in (v12a, 1), which
converge to the functional min v12b as F12 continues to shift upwards. Eventually, for very low
values of σ, the function F12 will be strictly positive, and one skill will always be preferred to
two.
Keeping this general behavior in mind, define two cutoffs, vˆ12 and vˆ21, between which two skills
are preferred to one, between which the function F12 is negative, and where v12a < vˆ12 ≤ v12b
and v12b ≤ vˆ21 ≤ 1. More specifically, let
vˆ12

∈ (v12a, v12b), −g
2
8σ2
≥ L12
= v12b,
−g2
8σ2
< L12
and
vˆ21

∈ (v12b, 1], −g
2
8σ2
≥ L12
= v12b,
−g2
8σ2
< L12
.
It follows that σ → ∞ implies vˆ12 → 0.7373, vˆ21 → 1, while σ → 0 implies vˆ12 → v12b, vˆ21 →
v12b. Implicit differentiation of the relation F12 = 0, which both cutoffs must satisfy, yields
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∂v
∂σ
=
g2
4σ3
(
2v + 2− 4
√
1− ( 12piv)2) ,
∂v
∂g
=
−g
4σ2
(
2v + 2− 4
√
1− ( 12piv)2) ,
and
∂2v
∂σ∂g
=
g
2σ3
(
2v + 2− 4
√
1− ( 12piv)2) .
The signs of these derivatives depend on the parenthetical expression in the denominator of
each. However, it is clear that the sign of ∂v∂σ is the same as the sign of
∂2v
∂σ∂g , and that the sign
of ∂v∂g is the opposite of this. If
∂F12
∂v
= 2v + 2− 4
√
1−
(
1
2piv
)2
< 0,
which occurs for v ∈ (v12a, v12b), then
∂v
∂σ
< 0,
∂v
∂g
> 0,
∂2v
∂σ∂g
< 0.
Alternatively, if v ∈ (v12b, 1), then
∂v
∂σ
> 0,
∂v
∂g
< 0,
∂2v
∂σ∂g
> 0.
Therefore,
∂vˆ12
∂σ
< 0,
∂vˆ12
∂g
> 0,
∂2vˆ12
∂σ∂g
< 0
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and
∂vˆ21
∂σ
> 0,
∂vˆ21
∂g
< 0,
∂2vˆ21
∂σ∂g
> 0.
Result 5 :
Let vˆ20 and vˆ02, where 12pi ≤ vˆ20 ≤ vˆ02 ≤ 1, denote the two values of v at which individuals are
just indifferent between acquiring two skills and acquiring none. Individuals characterized by
v > 12pi prefer two skills to none if either v < vˆ20 or v > vˆ02. Moreover,
∂vˆ20
∂g
> 0,
∂vˆ20
∂σ
< 0,
∂2vˆ20
∂σ∂g
< 0,
and
∂vˆ02
∂g
< 0,
∂vˆ02
∂σ
> 0,
∂2vˆ02
∂σ∂g
> 0.
In particular,
σ →∞ ⇒ 0.1592← vˆ20, vˆ02 → 0.8247
0← σ ⇒ vˆ20 → 0.1611← vˆ02.
Proof of Result 5 :
The proof of this result is similar to that of Result 4. In addition to the three cutoffs defined
in the previous results, the overall skill acquisition pattern depends also on the realization of
two other cutoffs determining the regions over which two skills are preferred to none, given
that v > 12pi . In particular, in this case two skills are preferred to none if
S∗2 > 0,
which simplifies to
v2 + 1− g2
(
1
2σ
+
1
16σ2
)
− arcsin
(
1
2piv
)
pi
− 2v
√
1−
(
1
2piv
)2
< 0.
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For notational convenience, let F02 denote the function on the left side of this inequality, and let
L02 denote the limiting function of F02 as σ →∞. Roots of ∂F02∂v = 0 for v ∈
(
1
2pi , 1
)
are given by
(v02a, v02b) =

√√√√1
2
−
√
1− 1
pi2
2
,
√√√√1
2
+
√
1− 1
pi2
2
 ≈ (0.1611, 0.9869).
Thus,
∂F02
∂v
= 2v − 2
√
1−
(
1
2piv
)2
> 0, v ∈ ( 12pi , v02a)⋃(v02b, 1) ≈ (.1592, .1611)⋃(0.9869, 1),
< 0, v ∈ (v02a, v02b) ≈ (0.1611, 0.9869).
L02 clearly behaves in the same manner, as decreases in σ merely shift F02 vertically down-
ward relative to L02. Moreover, L02(1) ≈ −0.0508, which is negative. Therefore, no root of
F02 exists for v ∈ (v02b, 1). Two potential roots of F02 remain to be considered, namely one in
the interval
(
1
2pi , v02a
)
, denoted by vˆ20, and one in the interval (v02a, v02b), denoted by vˆ02. For
L02, the value of the cutoff in the interval (v02a, v02b) is approximately 0.8247.
Implicit differentiation of F02 = 0 yields
∂v
∂σ
=
−g2 ( 1
2σ2
+ 1
8σ3
)(
2v − 2
√
1− ( 12piv)2) ,
∂v
∂g
=
g
(
1
σ +
1
8σ2
)(
2v − 2
√
1− ( 12piv)2) ,
and
∂2v
∂σ∂g
=
−g ( 1
σ2
+ 1
4σ3
)(
2v − 2
√
1− ( 12piv)2) .
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Therefore,
∂vˆ20
∂σ
< 0,
∂vˆ20
∂g
> 0,
∂2vˆ20
∂σ∂g
< 0
and
∂vˆ02
∂σ
> 0,
∂vˆ02
∂g
< 0,
∂2vˆ02
∂σ∂g
> 0.
It follows that σ →∞ implies vˆ20 →
(
1
2pi
)
, vˆ02 → 0.8247, while σ → 0 implies vˆ20 → v02a, vˆ02 →
v02a.
Result 6 :
The individual acquiring two skills in the context of a simultaneous choice cost complemen-
tarity (economy of scope) selects diversity
δA∗ =

pi, v ≤ 12piγ
2 arcsin
(
1
2piγv
)
, v > 12piγ
at skill levels
λA∗21 = λ
A∗
22 = g
(
1 +
1
4γσ
)
.
Moreover, for j = 1, 2,
∂λA∗2j
∂γ
< 0,
∂2λA∗2j
∂γ∂g
< 0,
∂2λA∗2j
∂γ∂σ
> 0,
and, for v > 12piγ ,
∂δA∗
∂γ
< 0,
∂2δA∗
∂γ∂v
> 0.
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Proof of Result 6 :
The proof of the first part of this result is virtually identical to that of Result 2 and is thus
omitted. The additional comparative statics expressions are as follows:
∂λA∗21
∂γ
=
∂λA∗22
∂γ
=
−g
4γ2σ
< 0,
∂2λA∗21
∂γ∂g
=
∂2λA∗22
∂γ∂g
=
−1
4γ2σ
< 0,
∂2λA∗21
∂γ∂σ
=
∂2λA∗22
∂γ∂σ
=
g
4γ2σ2
> 0.
In addition, for v > 12piγ ,
∂δA∗
∂γ
=
−1
pivγ2
√
1−
(
1
2piγv
)2 < 0,
∂2δA∗
∂γ∂v
=
1
piγ2v2
(
1−
(
1
2piγv
)2) 12 + 1
4pi3γ4v4
(
1−
(
1
2piγv
)2) 32 > 0.
Result 7.1 :
Individuals with v ≤ 12piγ facing a simultaneous choice cost complementarity (economy of
scope) prefer two skills to one if either
(i) γ ≤ 12 or
(ii) γ > 12 , v < vˆ
A
21, and σ ≥ σˆA21.
Result 7.2 :
For γ > 12 ,
∂vˆA21
∂g
< 0,
∂vˆA21
∂σ
> 0,
∂vˆA21
∂γ
< 0,
∂2vˆA21
∂γ∂g
< 0,
∂2vˆA21
∂γ∂σ
> 0.
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Moreover,
σ →∞ ⇒

γ → 1 ⇒ 0← vˆA21
1
2 ← γ ⇒ vˆA21 → 1pi
0← σ ⇒ 0← vˆA21.
Proof of Result 7 :
If any values of v exist such that some individuals with v ≤ 12piγ prefer two skills to one while
others do not, these may be found where
SA∗2 > S
∗
1 ,
which simplifies to
v2(2γ − 1) + 2v + 2γ − 2 + g
2
8γσ2
(2γ − 1) < 0 (A.1)
in the case that v ≤ 12piγ . For a given value of v satisfying this relation with equality, the
following derivatives are implicit:
∂v
∂g
=
−g(2γ − 1)
8γσ2[v(2γ − 1) + 1] < 0, γ >
1
2
,
∂v
∂σ
=
g2(2γ − 1)
8γσ3[v(2γ − 1) + 1] > 0, γ >
1
2
,
∂v
∂γ
=
−v2 − 1− g2
8γσ2
+ g
2(2γ−1)
16γ2σ2
v(2γ − 1) + 1 < 0.
Moreover,
∂2v
∂γ∂σ
=
g2
4γσ3
− g2(2γ−1)
8γ2σ3
v(2γ − 1) + 1 > 0,
∂2v
∂γ∂g
=
−g
4γσ2
+ g(2γ−1)
8γ2σ2
v(2γ − 1) + 1 < 0.
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In identifying cutoff candidates, consider three cases for the value of γ, namely γ = 12 , γ <
1
2 ,
and γ > 12 . When γ =
1
2 , relation (17) simplifies greatly to
v <
1
2
.
Moreover, in this case, 12piγ =
1
pi <
1
2 . Therefore, all individuals characterized by v ≤ 12piγ prefer
two skills to one at this value of the cost complementarity.
For the other two ranges of γ considered, the analysis is somewhat less straightforward. More
generally, the roots of FA12 are given by
v =
−1
2γ − 1
[
1∓
√
1− (2γ − 1)
(
2γ − 2 + g
2(2γ − 1)
8γσ2
)]
.
In the case that γ < 12 , it follows from Descartes’ Rule of Signs that F
A
12 has at most two
positive real roots, the expressions for which are given above, and that no negative real roots
exist. The corresponding parabola opens downward. Therefore, in the event that no positive
real roots exist, two skills are always preferred to one for v ≤ 12piγ . If the roots are, in fact,
real, then one of these can be eliminated from consideration because it is greater than one. In
consequence, define the only candidate cutoff for this range of γ as
vA21 ≡
−1
2γ − 1
[
1−
√
1− (2γ − 1)
(
2γ − 2 + g
2(2γ − 1)
8γσ2
)]
.
This root is real when
1 ≥ (2γ − 1)
(
2γ − 2 + g
2(2γ − 1)
8γσ2
)
,
or when
σ2(4γ2 − 6γ + 1) ≤ −g
2(2γ − 1)2
8γ
.
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If (4γ2 − 6γ + 1) ≥ 0, which occurs when γ ≤ 3−
√
5
4 <
1
2 , then no real value of σ exists that
satisfies this relation, so vA21 is not real, and two skills are preferred to one for all v ≤ 12piγ . If,
on the other hand, (4γ2 − 6γ + 1) < 0, which occurs for 3−
√
5
4 < γ <
1
2 , a real v
A
21 exists for
σ ≥
√
−g2(2γ − 1)2
8γ(4γ2 − 6γ + 1) .
The remaining question for this range of γ and σ is then that of how vA21 compares with
1
2piγ .
Note first that ∂v
A
21
∂σ < 0. Therefore, v
A
21 takes on its lowest value when uncertainty is at its
maximum. It is straightforward to show that this minimum value is always greater than 12piγ
for 3−
√
5
4 < γ <
1
2 . In particular, note that σ →∞ implies that
vA21 →
−1
2γ − 1[1−
√
1− (2γ − 1)(2γ − 2)] ≡ v¯A21,
which is monotonically decreasing in γ over the relevant range, as is 12piγ . In addition, the
former function of γ falls everywhere above the latter over this domain, as can be inferred by
evaluating both at the endpoints of the domain considered. For γ = 3−
√
5
4 , the limiting value
of v¯A21 is approximately 1.62, while that of
1
2piγ is 0.83. Similarly, when γ =
1
2 , the limiting
value of v¯A21 is
1
2 (apply L’Hopital’s Rule), while that of
1
2piγ is
1
pi . In other words, even when
uncertainty is sufficiently high that a positive real cutoff above which one skill is preferred to
two exists, this cutoff falls everywhere above the boundary of the set of individuals under con-
sideration, namely those who find maximum diversity optimal in the event that they acquire
two skills. Therefore, all individuals characterized by v ≤ 12piγ prefer two skills to one when
γ < 12 .
Next, consider the case that γ > 12 . For notational convenience in this case, define σˆ
A
21 as the
value of σ that makes the constant term in FA12 equal to zero, or
σˆA21 ≡
√
−g2(2γ − 1)
16γ(γ − 1) .
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Then, note that Descartes’ Rule of Signs indicates that FA12 has at most one positive real root,
which is given by vA21, as defined above. This root is positive and real if
1−
√
1− (2γ − 1)
(
2γ − 2 + g
2(2γ − 1)
8γσ2
)
≤ 0,
or
(2γ − 1)
(
2γ − 2 + g
2(2γ − 1)
8γσ2
)
≤ 0.
Since the first term on the left side of this inequality is always positive for γ > 12 , this will only
hold if
2γ − 2 + g
2(2γ − 1)
8γσ2
≤ 0,
which is true for σ ≥ σˆA21, which was defined above. For those cases in which vA21 exists, now
consider its relationship to the term 12piγ :
If γ > 12 and σ ≥ σˆA21, then it follows that
∂vA21
∂σ > 0 and
∂vA21
∂γ < 0. Therefore, v
A
21 must take on
its maximum value as σ → ∞, in which case vA21 again converges to v¯A21, which is sometimes
but not always greater than 12piγ for γ ∈
(
1
2 , 1
)
. Similarly, vA21 takes on its minimum value when
σ → σˆA21. In particular, in this case vA21 → 0, which is clearly less than 12piγ .
Therefore, in general for γ > 12 , define
vˆA21 ≡ min
{
vA21,
1
2piγ
}
,
such that 0 ≤ vA21 ≤ 1, and note that two skills are preferred to one for v < vˆA21.
Result 8 :
Individuals with v ≤ 12piγ facing a simultaneous choice cost complementarity prefer two skills
to none (economy of scope) if v < vˆA20 and either
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(i) γ ≤ 12 or
(ii) γ > 12 and σ ≤ σˆA20.
Moreover,
∂vˆA20
∂γ
< 0,
∂vˆA20
∂σ
< 0,
∂vˆA20
∂g
> 0,
∂2vˆA20
∂γ∂σ
> 0,
∂2vˆA20
∂γ∂g
< 0.
In particular,
σ →∞ ⇒

γ → 12 ⇒ 0← vˆA20
0← γ ⇒ vˆA20 → 1
0← σ ⇒

γ → 1 ⇒ 12pi ← vˆA20
0← γ ⇒ vˆA20 → 1.
Proof of Result 8 :
Two skills are preferred to none if
SA∗2 > 0.
For those with v ≤ 12piγ , this becomes
v2 + 1− 1
2γ
− g
2
2γσ
− g
2
16γ2σ2
< 0,
which simplifies to
v < vA20 ≡
√
1
2γ
− 1 + g
2
2γσ
+
g2
16γ2σ2
,
provided that γ and σ are such that the value of this cutoff is real. It is always real for γ ≤ 12 ,
as then 12γ > 1. However, if γ >
1
2 , then a real value of v
A
20 only exists if
1
2γ
− 1 + g
2
2γσ
+
g2
16γ2σ2
≥ 0,
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or if
σ ≤ σˆA20 ≡
2γg2 + g
√
4γ2 + γ(4g2 − 2)
8γ2 − 4γ ,
since at most one positive real root for σ exists in this case. In addition, note that implicit
differentiation of the expression FA02 = 0 yields
∂vA20
∂γ
=
−2v2 − 2− g2
8γ2σ2
4γv
< 0,
∂vA20
∂σ
=
−g2
σ2
− g2
4γσ3
4γv
< 0,
∂vA20
∂g
=
2g
σ +
g
4γσ2
4γv
> 0,
Furthermore,
∂2vA20
∂γ∂g
=
−g
16γ3σ2v
< 0,
∂2vA20
∂γ∂σ
=
g2
16γ3σ3v
> 0.
Therefore, in the case that γ ≤ 12 , vA20 converges to
v¯A20 ≡
√
1
2γ
− 1
as σ →∞. This expression is monotonically decreasing in γ. Moreover, as γ → 12 , this limiting
value of vA20 converges to zero. Similarly, as γ → 0, both v¯A20 and the value of 12piγ approach
infinity, indicating that the cutoff will take on the value of the upper limit of the v-domain
considered, namely 1.
When γ > 12 , v
A
20 → 0 as σ approaches the upper limit of its range for which vA20 exists, or σˆA20.
In both cases for γ, vA20 converges to 1 (infinity) as σ → 0. Therefore, define
vˆA20 ≡ min
{
vA20,
1
2piγ
}
,
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such that 0 ≤ vA20 ≤ 1. Then, two skills are preferred to none for v < vˆA20.
The remaining proofs for the extension follow the same methodology as those above and are
therefore omitted.
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Appendix B
Simulations
Basic model
This section presents several examples of the way in which the number of skills optimally
acquired varies with g, v, and σ. The number of skills chosen is evaluated for nine different
values of g and v, for each value of σ considered. The first column in each table provides an
example of individuals with v ≤ 12pi , while the remaining columns correspond to individuals
characterized by v > 12pi .
Table 1 below illustrates the skill acquisition pattern for the lowest levels of uncertainty
(i.e., σ ≤ 0.06). In particular, Table 1 indicates that all individuals acquire one skill for very
low uncertainty. In this case, the level of uncertainty is too low to provide disincentive ef-
fects for individuals of high ability balance or incentive effects for those of low balance. The
expected skill utilization rate is virtually deterministic, so the marginal level surplus from a
second skill is large and negative. As a result, all choose full specialization.
Table 1: Skill acquisition pattern for σ ≤ 0.06.
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
g\v 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
0.1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
0.2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
0.3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
0.4 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
0.5 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
0.6 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
0.7 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
0.8 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
0.9 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

The next six tables illustrate the way in which the skill acquisition pattern evolves for fur-
ther increases in uncertainty. Table 2 below indicates that individuals of lowest general ability
and highest ability balance are the first to respond to increases in uncertainty by choosing to
acquire no skills. In light of the analytic results above, this stems from the facts that these
individuals (1) acquire a low level of skill, which translates into a relatively low return, and
(2) find skill acquisition very costly: this combination provides a strong disincentive for skill
investment.
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Table 2: Skill acquisition pattern for σ = 0.1

g\v 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
0.1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1
0.2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
0.3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
0.4 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
0.5 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
0.6 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
0.7 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
0.8 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
0.9 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

Tables 3-7 below demonstrate that individuals with lower levels of v generally face disin-
centive effects from uncertainty, while those with the highest levels of v, who are the least
balanced, generally face incentive effects from the same. In other words, increases in un-
certainty cause the first group to be less likely to acquire any skills, with this effect most
pronounced for individuals of lower general ability, while such increases cause the latter group
to be more likely to acquire multiple skills. Extremely high levels of uncertainty discourage
skill acquisition by any but the least balanced. More generally able individuals over-invest
in skill level and face a higher cost from that investment; as a result, they are less likely to
diversify, given that they choose to acquire one skill.
Table 3: Skill acquisition pattern for σ = 0.3
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
g\v 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
0.1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2
0.2 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1
0.3 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
0.4 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
0.5 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
0.6 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
0.7 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
0.8 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
0.9 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

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Table 4: Skill acquisition pattern for σ = 0.7

g\v 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
0.1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2
0.2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2
0.3 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 2
0.4 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 2
0.5 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
0.6 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
0.7 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
0.8 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
0.9 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

Table 5: Skill acquisition pattern for σ = 2.0

g\v 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
0.1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
0.2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2
0.3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2
0.4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2
0.5 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 2
0.6 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 2
0.7 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 2 2
0.8 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 2 2
0.9 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 2

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Table 6: Skill acquisition pattern for σ = 5.0

g\v 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
0.1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
0.2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
0.3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2
0.4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2
0.5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2
0.6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2
0.7 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 2
0.8 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 2
0.9 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 2

Table 7 below illustrates the skill acquisition pattern for the highest levels of uncertainty.
In particular, most individuals acquire no skills, while those with the very highest levels of v all
acquire two. The surplus from skill level eventually approaches zero as uncertainty approaches
infinity, and this leaves individuals with the benefit only from diversification. The magnitude
of this benefit is small relative to the cost of skill acquisition for most individuals, so they opt
out of the skilled labor market, regardless of their degree of general ability.
Table 7: Skill acquisition pattern for σ ≥ 50
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
g\v 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
0.1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
0.2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
0.3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
0.4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
0.5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
0.6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
0.7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
0.8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
0.9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2

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Extended model, economy-of-scope
very low uncertainty: σ = 0.005
Table 8: Skill acquisition pattern for γ = 0.9, 0.7

g\v 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
0.1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
0.2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
0.3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
0.4 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
0.5 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
0.6 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
0.7 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
0.8 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
0.9 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

Table 9: Skill acquisition pattern for γ = 0.5

g\v 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
0.1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
0.2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
0.3 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
0.4 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
0.5 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
0.6 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
0.7 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
0.8 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
0.9 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

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low uncertainty: σ = 0.05
Table 10: Skill acquisition pattern for γ = 0.9

g\v 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
0.1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
0.2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
0.3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
0.4 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
0.5 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
0.6 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
0.7 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
0.8 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
0.9 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

Table 11: Skill acquisition pattern for γ = 0.7

g\v 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
0.1 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
0.2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
0.3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
0.4 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
0.5 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
0.6 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
0.7 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
0.8 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
0.9 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

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Table 12: Skill acquisition pattern for γ = 0.5

g\v 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
0.1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
0.2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
0.3 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
0.4 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
0.5 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
0.6 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
0.7 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
0.8 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
0.9 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

moderate uncertainty: σ = 1.0
Table 13: Skill acquisition pattern for γ = 0.9

g\v 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
0.1 0 0 0 0 2 2 2 2 2
0.2 0 0 0 0 2 2 2 2 2
0.3 0 0 0 0 2 2 2 2 2
0.4 0 0 0 0 2 2 2 2 2
0.5 0 0 0 0 2 2 2 2 2
0.6 0 0 0 1 2 2 2 2 2
0.7 0 0 1 1 2 2 2 2 2
0.8 0 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2
0.9 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2

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Table 14: Skill acquisition pattern for γ = 0.7

g\v 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
0.1 0 0 0 0 2 2 2 2 2
0.2 0 0 0 0 2 2 2 2 2
0.3 0 0 0 0 2 2 2 2 2
0.4 0 0 0 2 2 2 2 2 2
0.5 0 0 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
0.6 2 0 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
0.7 2 0 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
0.8 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
0.9 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

Table 15: Skill acquisition pattern for γ = 0.5

g\v 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
0.1 2 0 0 0 2 2 2 2 2
0.2 2 2 0 0 2 2 2 2 2
0.3 2 2 2 0 2 2 2 2 2
0.4 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
0.5 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
0.6 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
0.7 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
0.8 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
0.9 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

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high uncertainty: σ = 2.0
Table 16: Skill acquisition pattern for γ = 0.9

g\v 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
0.1 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 2 2
0.2 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 2 2
0.3 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 2 2
0.4 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 2 2
0.5 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 2 2
0.6 0 0 0 0 2 2 2 2 2
0.7 0 0 0 0 2 2 2 2 2
0.8 0 0 0 1 2 2 2 2 2
0.9 0 0 0 1 2 2 2 2 2

Table 17: Skill acquisition pattern for γ = 0.7

g\v 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
0.1 0 0 0 2 2 2 2 2 2
0.2 0 0 0 2 2 2 2 2 2
0.3 0 0 0 2 2 2 2 2 2
0.4 0 0 0 2 2 2 2 2 2
0.5 0 0 0 2 2 2 2 2 2
0.6 0 0 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
0.7 0 0 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
0.8 0 0 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
0.9 2 0 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

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Table 18: Skill acquisition pattern for γ = 0.5

g\v 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
0.1 0 0 0 2 2 2 2 2 2
0.2 2 0 0 2 2 2 2 2 2
0.3 2 2 0 2 2 2 2 2 2
0.4 2 2 0 2 2 2 2 2 2
0.5 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
0.6 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
0.7 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
0.8 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
0.9 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

Table 19: Skill acquisition pattern for γ = 0.4

g\v 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
0.1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
0.2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
0.3 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
0.4 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
0.5 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
0.6 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
0.7 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
0.8 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
0.9 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

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very high uncertainty: σ = 6.0
Table 20: Skill acquisition pattern for γ = 0.9

g\v 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
0.1 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 2 2
0.2 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 2 2
0.3 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 2 2
0.4 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 2 2
0.5 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 2 2
0.6 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 2 2
0.7 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 2 2
0.8 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 2 2
0.9 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 2 2

Table 21: Skill acquisition pattern for γ = 0.8

g\v 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
0.1 0 0 0 0 2 2 2 2 2
0.2 0 0 0 0 2 2 2 2 2
0.3 0 0 0 0 2 2 2 2 2
0.4 0 0 0 0 2 2 2 2 2
0.5 0 0 0 0 2 2 2 2 2
0.6 0 0 0 0 2 2 2 2 2
0.7 0 0 0 0 2 2 2 2 2
0.8 0 0 0 0 2 2 2 2 2
0.9 0 0 0 2 2 2 2 2 2

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Table 22: Skill acquisition pattern for γ = 0.6

g\v 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
0.1 0 0 0 2 2 2 2 2 2
0.2 0 0 0 2 2 2 2 2 2
0.3 0 0 0 2 2 2 2 2 2
0.4 0 0 0 2 2 2 2 2 2
0.5 0 0 0 2 2 2 2 2 2
0.6 0 0 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
0.7 0 0 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
0.8 0 0 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
0.9 0 0 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

Table 23: Skill acquisition pattern for γ = 0.4

g\v 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
0.1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
0.2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
0.3 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
0.4 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
0.5 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
0.6 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
0.7 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
0.8 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
0.9 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

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MATLAB code for simulations:
DS1.m
Computes surplus and the number of skills chosen for nine values each of v
and g in matrix form, with g on the vertical axis and v on the horizontal.
The value of sigma (s) may be changed as necessary. Used to conduct simulations for the basic
model.
B = zeros(9, 9, 3);
s = .05;
for i = 1 : 9
g = i/10;
for j = 1 : 9
v = j/10;
B0 = 0;
B1 = (g2)/s+ (g2)/(4 ∗ s2)− (1− v)2;
if v <= (1/(2 ∗ pi))
B2 = (g2)/s+ (g2)/(8 ∗ s2)− 1− 2 ∗ v2;
else
B2 = (g2)/s+(g2)/(8∗s2)+(2∗asin(1/(2∗pi∗v)))/pi+−2−2∗v2+4∗v∗cos(asin(1/(2∗pi∗v)));
end
B(i, j, 1) = B0;
B(i, j, 2) = B1;
B(i, j, 3) = B2;
end
end
[S, I] = max(B, [], 3);
I = I − ones(9, 9);
surplus = S
123
skills = I
DS2.m
Used to conduct simulations for cost complementarity with simultaneous choice (economy-of-
scope). The variable j represents γ.
B = zeros(9, 9, 3);
s = 0.5;
j = .8;
for i = 1 : 9
g = i/10;
for k = 1 : 9
v = k/10;
B0 = 0;
B1 = (g2)/s+ (g2)/(4 ∗ s2)− (1− v)2;
if v <= (1/(2 ∗ pi ∗ j))
B2 = (g2)/s+ (g2)/(8 ∗ j ∗ s2) + 1− 2 ∗ j ∗ v2 − 2 ∗ j;
else
B2 = (g2)/s + (g2)/(8 ∗ j ∗ s2) + (2 ∗ asin(1/(2 ∗ pi ∗ j ∗ v)))/pi − 2 ∗ j − 2 ∗ j ∗ v2 + 4 ∗ v ∗
cos(asin(1/(2 ∗ pi ∗ j ∗ v)));
end
B(i, k, 1) = B0;
B(i, k, 2) = B1;
B(i, k, 3) = B2;
end
end
[S, I] = max(B, [], 3);
I = I − ones(9, 9);
surplus= S
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skills= I
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